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An Empirical Study of US Environmental Federalism: RCRA Enforcement From 1998 to 2011

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  • Sjöberg, Eric
  • Xu, Jing

Abstract

State enforcement of federal environmental legislation has long been associated with the fear of environmental freeriding and states being too lenient, potentially leading to a race-to-the bottom in enforcement. This paper analyzes the effect of enforcement decentralization from 1998 to 2011 on a range of enforcement outcomes across US states as they have been authorized to implement their own programs aligning with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). In this study, we look at the association between enforcement decentralization and corresponding outcomes, namely the number of evaluations, number of detected violations, and the amount of monetary penalties. Results showed that enforcement behaviors have not changed significantly as states have assumed more enforcement responsibilities; hence, we found no evidence of a race-to-the-bottom scenario associated with RCRA decentralization.

Suggested Citation

  • Sjöberg, Eric & Xu, Jing, 2018. "An Empirical Study of US Environmental Federalism: RCRA Enforcement From 1998 to 2011," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 253-263.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:147:y:2018:i:c:p:253-263
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.01.024
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    5. Per G. Fredriksson & Le Wang, 2020. "The politics of environmental enforcement: the case of the Resource and Conservation Recovery Act," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(6), pages 2593-2613, June.
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    9. Jing Tang & Shilong Li, 2022. "How Do Environmental Regulation and Environmental Decentralization Affect Regional Green Innovation? Empirical Research from China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(12), pages 1-16, June.
    10. Na Zhang & Jinqian Deng & Fayyaz Ahmad & Muhammad Umar Draz, 2020. "Local Government Competition and Regional Green Development in China: The Mediating Role of Environmental Regulation," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(10), pages 1-22, May.
    11. Feng, Suling & Sui, Bo & Liu, Huimin & Li, Guoxiang, 2020. "Environmental decentralization and innovation in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 660-674.
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