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Co-enforcement of Common Pool Resources to Deter Encroachment: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Chile

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  • Carlos A. Chávez

    (Universidad de Talca and Interdisciplinary Center for Aquaculture Research (INCAR))

  • James J. Murphy

    (University of Alaska Anchorage)

  • John K. Stranlund

    (University of Massachusetts-Amherst)

Abstract

This work presents the results of framed field experiments designed to study the co-enforcement of access to common pool resources. The experiments were conducted in the field with artisanal fishers in Chile. In the experiments, members of a CPR group (called insiders) not only decided how much to harvest but also invest in monitoring to deter poaching by outsiders. Sanctions for poaching were exogenous as if provided by a government authority. Treatments varied the level of the sanction and whether the monitoring investment was voluntarily provided by insiders or collectively provided by a group vote. Results suggest that co-enforcement can reduce poaching by outsiders and increase harvests by insiders, but the insiders’ monitoring investments tended to offset their gains in harvest earnings. Higher poaching sanctions and voting on monitoring contributions, separately and together, led insiders to invest enough in monitoring to eliminate the average gains from poaching. However, poaching was not eliminated despite zero or negative average poaching earnings.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos A. Chávez & James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund, 2021. "Co-enforcement of Common Pool Resources to Deter Encroachment: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Chile," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 80(2), pages 425-450, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:80:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s10640-021-00591-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-021-00591-9
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common pool resources; Enforcement; Experimental economics; Field experiment; Poaching; Territorial use rights for fisheries; Chile;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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