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Winning hearts and minds in conflict-ridden areas: Development as a signal of benevolence

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  • Kumar, Dushyant
  • Roy Chowdhury, Prabal

Abstract

We examine the role of development in signalling governmental benevolence, thereby helping governments combat insurgency in conflict-ridden areas. While there is some literature on the role of development in mitigating conflict, very few studies examine the channel which is our focus, namely popular perception. With popular support being a core ingredient of any successful counter-insurgency program in conflict-ridden areas, investing in development becomes a vital tool in winning hearts and minds of the people, and consequently in controlling insurgency. Using a signalling game setup, we find that allowing for this possibility leads to higher investment in development relative to the socially efficient outcome. Finally, developmental projects that have greater effect on popular perception, e.g. those that are likely to get greater media coverage, or those with quick returns, get prioritised.

Suggested Citation

  • Kumar, Dushyant & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2022. "Winning hearts and minds in conflict-ridden areas: Development as a signal of benevolence," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:117:y:2022:i:c:s0264999322002875
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2022.106050
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflict; Development as signalling; Hearts and minds; Over-investment in (observable) development; Under-investment in unobservable development;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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