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The evolutionary game of emotions considering the influence of reputation

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  • Bai, Xi
  • Ye, Ye
  • Chen, Tong
  • Xie, Nenggang

Abstract

The influence of reputation and emotions on the evolution of cooperation is acknowledged, but current research predominantly focuses on one aspect. This paper integrates both reputation and emotions to examine their collective impacts on the evolution of cooperation. Initially, we define the expression of individual emotional profiles and emotional reputation. Subsequently, we consider the combined effects of the emotional reputation of an individual's neighbors and their interactive individuals on emotional responses. Further, an emotional transfer activation parameter is introduced. Lastly, we construct an algorithm for the evolutionary game of emotions. Simulation results demonstrate that considering emotional reputation is more conducive to the cooperation. The emotional reputation of interacting individuals has a greater influence on the development of positive emotions and the establishment of collaboration within groups than that of neighboring environments. In heterogeneous networks, considering the emotional reputation of neighbors increases the probability of “free-riding” by unfriendly people. When game parameters are set in favor of betrayal and negative emotions, the system evolves to produce “cautious and friendly people”. Individuals with stable emotions, high sympathy for the weak, and high respect for the strong dominate the group. Furthermore, the individuals' emotional expression towards both the weak and the strong exhibits an evolutionary synchronicity. Compared to other network structures, scale-free networks are more conducive to the evolutionary dominance of emotions of high respect for the strong.

Suggested Citation

  • Bai, Xi & Ye, Ye & Chen, Tong & Xie, Nenggang, 2024. "The evolutionary game of emotions considering the influence of reputation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 474(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:474:y:2024:i:c:s0096300324001814
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2024.128709
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