IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/apmaco/v466y2024ics0096300323006550.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Information-driven cooperation on adaptive cyber-physical systems

Author

Listed:
  • Yang, Guoli
  • Wu, Yu'e
  • Cavaliere, Matteo

Abstract

Cooperation among competitive populations hinges on trustworthy information usually obtained through personal experiences (private information) and social influence (public information) which often is obtained through interactions in the cyberspace. To reveal the coupled dynamics between information propagation on the cyberspace and evolutionary games in the physical world, we propose a double-layer dynamical graph model for adaptive cyber-physical systems. The reputation information aggregated from the cyber layer can be used for the decision-making in the physical layer, meanwhile the population evolution and competition in the physical layer will reorganise the information network in the cyber layer. Our results show that public and private information on the trustworthiness of others can play significantly different roles in the decision-making to cooperate or defect, leading to very different performance in the global prosperity of the population. Limited consideration for the available public information reduces the benefits of the reorganization of the information network in the cyber layer leading to the increasing of mutual defections. On the other way, when public information is prioritized, the reorganization of the cyber layer can facilitate cooperation. However, the optimal decision-making to maximize population prosperity strongly depends on the way the cyber layer is reorganized and on the opportune balance of public and private information. Our results highlight the importance of the interplay between information reliability and restructuring of the cyber layer for the resilience of cooperation and prosperity in cyber-physical systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Yang, Guoli & Wu, Yu'e & Cavaliere, Matteo, 2024. "Information-driven cooperation on adaptive cyber-physical systems," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 466(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:466:y:2024:i:c:s0096300323006550
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2023.128486
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0096300323006550
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.amc.2023.128486?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Karthik Panchanathan & Robert Boyd, 2004. "Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem," Nature, Nature, vol. 432(7016), pages 499-502, November.
    2. Maria Kleshnina & Christian Hilbe & Štěpán Šimsa & Krishnendu Chatterjee & Martin A. Nowak, 2023. "The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 14(1), pages 1-11, December.
    3. Christian Hilbe & Laura Schmid & Josef Tkadlec & Krishnendu Chatterjee & Martin A. Nowak, 2018. "Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 115(48), pages 12241-12246, November.
    4. Fernando P. Santos & Francisco C. Santos & Jorge M. Pacheco, 2018. "Social norm complexity and past reputations in the evolution of cooperation," Nature, Nature, vol. 555(7695), pages 242-245, March.
    5. Serguei Saavedra & David Smith & Felix Reed-Tsochas, 2010. "Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity and Imitative Trust," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 5(10), pages 1-6, October.
    6. Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund, 1998. "Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring," Nature, Nature, vol. 393(6685), pages 573-577, June.
    7. M.A. Nowak & K. Sigmund, 1998. "Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring/ The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity," Working Papers ir98040, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    8. F. Fu & L.-H. Liu & L. Wang, 2007. "Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on heterogeneous Newman-Watts small-world network," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 56(4), pages 367-372, April.
    9. Yang, Zhengzhi & Zheng, Lei & Perc, Matjaž & Li, Yumeng, 2024. "Interaction state Q-learning promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 463(C).
    10. Mitrović, Marija & Tadić, Bosiljka, 2012. "Dynamics of bloggers’ communities: Bipartite networks from empirical data and agent-based modeling," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 391(21), pages 5264-5278.
    11. Jörg Gross & Carsten K. W. Dreu, 2019. "The rise and fall of cooperation through reputation and group polarization," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10, December.
    12. Flávio L Pinheiro & Jorge M Pacheco & Francisco C Santos, 2012. "From Local to Global Dilemmas in Social Networks," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(2), pages 1-6, February.
    13. Maria Kleshnina & Christian Hilbe & Stepan Simsa & Krishnendu Chatterjee & Martin A. Nowak, 2023. "The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games," Post-Print hal-04210205, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gao, Meng & Li, Zhi & Wu, Te, 2023. "Evolutionary dynamics of friendship-driven reputation strategies," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 175(P1).
    2. Bai, Xi & Ye, Ye & Chen, Tong & Xie, Nenggang, 2024. "The evolutionary game of emotions considering the influence of reputation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 474(C).
    3. Quan, Ji & Nie, Jiacheng & Chen, Wenman & Wang, Xianjia, 2022. "Keeping or reversing social norms promote cooperation by enhancing indirect reciprocity," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    4. Isamu Okada, 2020. "A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-17, July.
    5. Simone Righi & Károly Takács, 2022. "Gossip: Perspective Taking to Establish Cooperation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1086-1100, December.
    6. Wang, Xianjia & Ding, Rui & Zhao, Jinhua & Gu, Cuiling, 2022. "The rise and fall of cooperation in populations with multiple groups," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 413(C).
    7. Misato Inaba & Nobuyuki Takahashi, 2019. "Linkage Based on the Kandori Norm Successfully Sustains Cooperation in Social Dilemmas," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15, February.
    8. Ding, Rui & Wang, Xianjia & Liu, Yang & Zhao, Jinhua & Gu, Cuiling, 2023. "Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks under an external incentive mechanism," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    9. Wang, Xianjia & Ding, Rui & Zhao, Jinhua & Chen, Wenman & Gu, Cuiling, 2022. "Competition of punishment and reward among inequity-averse individuals in spatial public goods games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    10. Wang, Xianjia & Ding, Rui & Zhao, Jinhua & Chen, Wenman, 2021. "The rise and fall of donation behavior through reputation," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    11. Radzvilavicius, Arunas, 2021. "Tolerant moral judgment drives evolution of collective action," OSF Preprints neq9g, Center for Open Science.
    12. Christian Hilbe & Maria Kleshnina & Kateřina Staňková, 2023. "Evolutionary Games and Applications: Fifty Years of ‘The Logic of Animal Conflict’," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 1035-1048, December.
    13. Isamu Okada & Hitoshi Yamamoto & Satoshi Uchida, 2020. "Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern- Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-10, February.
    14. Wang, Bin & Kang, Wenjun & Sheng, Jinfang & Cheng, Lvhang & Hou, Zhengang, 2021. "Effects of trust-driven updating rule based on reputation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 579(C).
    15. Zhu, Wenqiang & Pan, Qiuhui & He, Mingfeng, 2022. "Exposure-based reputation mechanism promotes the evolution of cooperation," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    16. Wang, Chengjiang & Wang, Li & Wang, Juan & Sun, Shiwen & Xia, Chengyi, 2017. "Inferring the reputation enhances the cooperation in the public goods game on interdependent lattices," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 293(C), pages 18-29.
    17. Charness, Gary & Du, Ninghua & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2011. "Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 361-375, June.
    18. Suzuki, Shinsuke & Akiyama, Eizo, 2008. "Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 426-436.
    19. Hu, Menglong & Wang, Juan & Kong, Lingcong & An, Kang & Bi, Tao & Guo, Baohong & Dong, Enzeng, 2015. "Incorporating the information from direct and indirect neighbors into fitness evaluation enhances the cooperation in the social dilemmas," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 47-52.
    20. De Cremer, David & Dijk, Eric van, 2009. "Paying for sanctions in social dilemmas: The effects of endowment asymmetry and accountability," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 45-55, May.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:466:y:2024:i:c:s0096300323006550. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/applied-mathematics-and-computation .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.