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Heterogeneous Effects of Informational Nudges on Pro-social Behavior

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  • Bao Jiayi

    (Department of Business Economics & Public Policy, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, USA)

  • Ho Benjamin

    (Department of Economics, Vassar College, 124 Raymond Ave, Poughkeepsie, New York 12604, USA)

Abstract

Numerous experimental studies of informational nudges both in the lab and the field have demonstrated not just that informational nudges are effective policy tools for influencing behavior, but also that nudges have heterogeneous impacts that differ depending on the characteristics of the person involved and the situation. We adapt Andreoni’s theory of warm-glow impure altruism to account for how altruism motives respond differently depending on the disposition of the person and the situation. The model explains both positive spillovers (moral cleansing) and negative spillovers (moral licensing) for behavioral interventions, showing that targeting of informational campaigns depends on the complementarity between people’s traits and the intervention’s content. More importantly, the design of economic incentives (like Pigouvian taxes) to shift economic behavior should depend on both the distribution of social preferences in the population and the use of behavioral interventions.

Suggested Citation

  • Bao Jiayi & Ho Benjamin, 2015. "Heterogeneous Effects of Informational Nudges on Pro-social Behavior," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(4), pages 1619-1655, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:15:y:2015:i:4:p:1619-1655:n:14
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2014-0125
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Maho Nakagawa & Mathieu Lefebvre & Anne Stenger, 2022. "Long-lasting effects of incentives and social preference: A public goods experiment," Post-Print hal-03777681, HAL.
    3. Beyene, Abebe D. & Jeuland, Marc & Sebsibie, Samuel & Hassen, Sied & Mekonnen, Alemu & Meles, Tensay H. & Pattanayak, Subhrendu K. & Klug, Thomas, 2022. "Pre-paid meters and household electricity use behaviors: Evidence from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    4. Isoaho, K. & Burgas, D. & Janasik, N. & Mönkkönen, M. & Peura, M. & Hukkinen, J.I., 2019. "Changing forest stakeholders’ perception of ecosystem services with linguistic nudging," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 40(C).

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