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Civility norm violations and political accountability

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  • Drew Cagle
  • Nicholas T. Davis

Abstract

Introduction This short article investigates how violations of civility norms by politicians affect attitudes about the importance of norms and demand for political accountability after wrongdoing. Results Our main findings are twofold: (1) support for norms and (2) demand for punishing norm‐breaking increases when parties hold political officials accountable for their actions—especially in the case of in‐group norm‐breaking. Conclusions These findings contribute to a growing literature on Americans’ support for norms by implying that elites play an important role in sustaining the standards of democratic exchange. When elites impose punishment on copartisan elites, they signal to the public that accountability is acceptable.

Suggested Citation

  • Drew Cagle & Nicholas T. Davis, 2024. "Civility norm violations and political accountability," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 105(3), pages 832-842, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:105:y:2024:i:3:p:832-842
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.13383
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