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Evolutionary metaphors and the justification of economic efficiency

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  • Marina Bianchi

    (Department of Economics and Environment, University of Cassino, Italy)

Abstract

The selection principle of evolutionary biology seems to save the economist from having to specify all the complexities of individual optimizing choices. But concentrating exclusively on the outcomes of evolutionary processes as efficient states does not carry us very far. Either the achievement of efficiency has to be restated using the individual optimization rule, which deprives the evolutionary process of any special explanatory role; or, given that optimization provides insufficient guidance in a world of uncertainty, then it remains unclear just how the efficient social outcome is obtained. The alternative proposed and illustrated here is to break the link between selection and efficiency and to enlarge the sense of efficiency to include innovation and learning.

Suggested Citation

  • Marina Bianchi, 1994. "Evolutionary metaphors and the justification of economic efficiency," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 17-29, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:7:y:1994:i:1:p:17-29
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sidney G. Winter, 1964. "Economic "Natural Selection" and the Theory of the Firm," LEM Chapters Series, in: Yale Economic Essays, pages 225-272, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
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    5. Friedman, James, 1993. "Oligopoly theory," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: K. J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 4, volume 2, chapter 11, pages 491-534, Elsevier.
    6. Vanberg, Viktor, 1986. "Spontaneous Market Order and Social Rules," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 75-100, April.
    7. Fenoaltea, Stefano, 1975. "Authority, Efficiency, and Agricultural Organization in Medieval England and Beyond: A Hypothesis," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(4), pages 693-718, December.
    8. Ulrich Witt, 1986. "Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 245-266, May.
    9. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martti Vihanto, 1998. "Using Psychology to Reinforce the Austrian Argument for Freedom: The Case of Loan Decisions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 303-321, December.

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