IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fgv/epgrbe/v67y2013i1a3601.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Programas de incentivos fiscais são eficazes? Evidência a partir da avaliação do impacto do programa nota fiscal paulista sobre a arrecadação de ICMS

Author

Listed:
  • Mattos, Enlinson
  • Rocha, Fabiana
  • Toporcov, Patricia

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of Programa Nota Fiscal Paulista on tax revenue collection by the state of São Paulo. We observe a positive and significant effect on tertiary tax collection between 5% and 10% when São Paulo is compared to the other states in Brazil. We do not find a robust effect of the Program neither on total tax collection nor in the other sectors, as well as, evidence of a non-linear effect in time. When the analysis is restricted to the state of São Paulo, the estimates indicate that the Program did not increase real revenue collected by the tertiary sector compared to the other sectors. However, when the increase in tax collection is compared to the estimated raffle prizes the tax collection increases 2% of the average tax collected by the tertiary sector. We then conclude that the impact of the Program is very limited. It is necessary to remember that it was conducted an aggregated analysis. It is possible that more disaggregated studies can allow a better identification of the Program impact on specific sectors, but unfortunately this kind of data is not available.

Suggested Citation

  • Mattos, Enlinson & Rocha, Fabiana & Toporcov, Patricia, 2013. "Programas de incentivos fiscais são eficazes? Evidência a partir da avaliação do impacto do programa nota fiscal paulista sobre a arrecadação de ICMS," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 67(1), April.
    • Handle: RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:67:y:2013:i:1:a:3601
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/3601
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2007. "Tax Morale and Tax Evasion in Latin American Countries," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0732, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
    4. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    5. James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2007. "Tax Morale and Tax Evasion in Latin America," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0704, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Scotchmer, Suzanne & Slemrod, Joel, 1989. "Randomness in tax enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 17-32, February.
    8. Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-38, June.
    9. Beck, Nathaniel & Katz, Jonathan N., 1995. "What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(3), pages 634-647, September.
    10. Das-Gupta, Arindam, 1994. "A Theory of Hard-to-Tax Groups," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 49(Supplemen), pages 28-39.
    11. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
    12. James Alm & Michael McKee, 1998. "Extending the lessons of laboratory experiments on tax compliance to managerial and decision economics," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(4-5), pages 259-275.
    13. Alm, James, 1988. "Uncertain Tax Policies, Individual Behavior, and Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 237-245, March.
    14. Cowell, Frank A. & P.F. Gordon, James, 1988. "Unwillingness to pay : Tax evasion and public good provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 305-321, August.
    15. Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "Do People Care about Democracy?: Comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(1), pages 53-55, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Buettner, Thiess & Madzharova, Boryana & Zaddach, Orlando, 2023. "Income tax credits for consumer services: A tool for tackling VAT evasion?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    2. Joana Naritomi, 2019. "Consumers as Tax Auditors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(9), pages 3031-3072, September.
    3. Rodrigo Pereira de Oliveira & Bruno Ferreira Frascaroli, 2019. "Measuring the Efficiency of Tax Collection among Economic Sectors in Paraíba State Northeastern Brazil (2013-2015)," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 12(7), pages 24-33, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:fgv:epgrbe:v:67:n:1:a:5 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Vossler, Christian A. & McKee, Michael & Bruner, David M., 2021. "Behavioral effects of tax withholding on tax compliance: Implications for information initiatives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 301-319.
    3. Çule, Monika & Fulton, Murray, 2009. "Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 811-822, December.
    4. Alm, James & Shimshack, Jay, 2014. "Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 10(4), pages 209-274, December.
    5. James Alm & William D. Schulze & Carrie von Bose & Jubo Yan, 2019. "Appeals to Social Norms and Taxpayer Compliance," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(2), pages 638-666, October.
    6. James Alm, 2019. "What Motivates Tax Compliance?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 353-388, April.
    7. Kemme, David M. & Parikh, Bhavik & Steigner, Tanja, 2020. "Tax Morale and International Tax Evasion," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 55(3).
    8. James, Simon & Edwards, Alison, 2010. "An annotated bibliography of tax compliance and tax compliance costs," MPRA Paper 26106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Matthias Kasper & James Alm, 2022. "Does the Bomb-crater Effect Really Exist? Evidence from the Laboratory," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 78(1-2), pages 87-111.
    10. James Alm & Antoine Malézieux, 2021. "40 years of tax evasion games: a meta-analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(3), pages 699-750, September.
    11. Hallsworth, Michael & List, John A. & Metcalfe, Robert D. & Vlaev, Ivo, 2017. "The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 14-31.
    12. Castro, Lucio & Scartascini, Carlos, 2015. "Tax compliance and enforcement in the pampas evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 65-82.
    13. Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.
    14. Marcelo Bergolo & Rodrigo Ceni & Guillermo Cruces & Matias Giaccobasso & Ricardo Perez-Truglia, 2023. "Tax Audits as Scarecrows: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 110-153, February.
    15. Ortega, Daniel & Scartascini, Carlos, 2015. "Don't Blame the Messenger: A Field Experiment on Delivery Methods for Increasing Tax Compliance," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 7284, Inter-American Development Bank.
    16. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2002. "Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 87-99, July.
    17. Daniel Ortega & Carlos Scartascini, 2015. "Don't Blame the Messenger: A Field Experiment on Delivery Methods for Increasing Tax Compliance," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 91741, Inter-American Development Bank.
    18. Meinarni Asnawi, 2016. "Tax Compliance Decision Analysis: Audit Strategy, Audit Rate, Perceived Probability of Audit, and Taxpayer Ethics," Information Management and Business Review, AMH International, vol. 8(3), pages 11-21.
    19. Kasper, Matthias & Alm, James, 2022. "Audits, audit effectiveness, and post-audit tax compliance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 87-102.
    20. Marè, Mauro & Motroni, Antonello & Porcelli, Francesco, 2020. "How family ties affect trust, tax morale and underground economy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 235-252.
    21. Calvet Christian, Roberta & Alm, James, 2014. "Empathy, sympathy, and tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 62-82.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:67:y:2013:i:1:a:3601. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Núcleo de Computação da FGV EPGE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/epgvfbr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.