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Intergovernmental grants in Russia

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  • Elena Jarocińska

Abstract

Two hypotheses about the determinants of Russian intergovernmental grants are tested. According to the first hypothesis, federal transfers to regions correlate with recent voting behaviour of regional electorates. The second hypothesis states that transfers are higher in regions with politically powerful governors. I find a strong confirmation for the first hypothesis and no evidence for the second hypothesis for the years 1995–99. This result is robust across specifications. However, in the years 2000–2004 electoral variables show no effect on transfers. The only significant political variable is Putin’s visits to regions.

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  • Elena Jarocińska, 2010. "Intergovernmental grants in Russia," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 18(2), pages 405-427, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:etrans:v:18:y:2010:i:2:p:405-427
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.2009.00377.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Libman, 2015. "Words or deeds: what matters? On the role of symbolic action in political decentralization," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 801-838, November.
    2. Libman Alexander & Feld Lars P., 2013. "Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The Case of Russia," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 14(4), pages 449-482, December.
    3. Günther G. Schulze & Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir & Nikita Zakharov, 2016. "Corruption in Russia," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 135-171.
    4. Libman, Alexander, 2011. "Words or deeds – what matters? Experience of recentralization in Russian security agencies," MPRA Paper 29197, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of Decentralization," MPRA Paper 15854, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Israel Marques & Eugenia Nazrullaeva & Andrei Yakovlev, 2011. "From Competition to Dominance: Political Determinations of Federal Transfers in Russian Federation," HSE Working papers WP BRP 12/EC/2011, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    7. Xin Wan & Yuanyuan Ma & Kezhong Zhang, 2015. "Political determinants of intergovernmental transfers in a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime: evidence from China," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(27), pages 2803-2820, June.
    8. Libman, Alexander, 2013. "Natural resources and sub-national economic performance: Does sub-national democracy matter?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 82-99.
    9. Huang, Shuo & Fidrmuc, Jan & Fidrmuc, Jarko, 2015. "Whither China? Reform and economic integration among Chinese regions," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 94-110.
    10. Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Endogenous (De)Centralization and the Russian Federalism," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 9(1), pages 23-57.
    11. Vasyl Kvartiuk & Thomas Herzfeld, 2021. "Redistributive Politics in Russia: The Political Economy of Agricultural Subsidies," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 63(1), pages 1-30, March.
    12. Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Federalism and regionalism in transition countries: A survey," MPRA Paper 29196, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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