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Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralisation: The Case of Russia

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  • Lars P. Feld
  • Alexander Libman

Abstract

In a centralized federation, where tax rates and taxation rules are set by the federal government, manipulating the thoroughness of tax auditing and the effectiveness of tax collection could be attractive for regional authorities because of a variety of reasons. These range from tax competition to principal-agent problems, state capture and benefits of fiscal equalisation. In this paper we discuss strategic tax auditing and collection from the perspective of fiscal federalism and test for strategic tax collection empirically using data of the Russian Federation. Russia’s regional authorities in the 1990s have always been suspect of tax auditing manipulations in their favour. However, in the 2000s increasing bargaining power of the centre seems to induce tax collection bodies in the regions to manipulate tax auditing in favour of the federation. We find partial evidence in favour of both of these hypotheses.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars P. Feld & Alexander Libman, 2007. "Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralisation: The Case of Russia," CESifo Working Paper Series 2031, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2031
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    Cited by:

    1. Bönke, Timm & Jochimsen, Beate & Schröder, Carsten, 2014. "Fiscal federalism and tax enforcement," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100394, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Alexeev, Michael & Chernyavskiy, Andrey, 2018. "A tale of two crises: Federal transfers and regional economies in Russia in 2009 and 2014–2015," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 175-185.
    3. Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Federalism and regionalism in transition countries: A survey," MPRA Paper 29196, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of Decentralization," MPRA Paper 15854, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Bönke, Timm & Jochimsen, Beate & Schröder, Carsten, 2011. "Fiscal equalization and regions' (un)willingness-to-tax: Evidence from Germany," Economics Working Papers 2011-06, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    6. Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Endogenous (De)Centralization and the Russian Federalism," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 9(1), pages 23-57.
    7. Bönke Timm & Schröder Carsten & Jochimsen Beate, 2017. "Fiscal Equalization and Tax Enforcement," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 377-409, August.
    8. Libman, A., 2010. "Empirical Research on Determinants of Decentralization: A Literature Survey," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 6, pages 10-29.
    9. Alexander Libman, 2012. "Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 302-336, December.
    10. Alexeev, Michael (Алексеев, Майкл) & Mamedov, Arseny (Мамедов, Арсений) & Fomina, Evgenia (Фомина, Евгения) & Deryugin, Alexander (Дерюгин, Александр), 2017. "Influence of the Main Characteristics of Interbudgetary Relations on the Indicators of Economic Development of the Subjects of the Russian Federation [Влияние Основных Характеристик Межбюджетных От," Working Papers 031717, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    11. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6913 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Timm Bönke & Beate Jochimsen & Carsten Schröder, 2013. "Fiscal Federalism and Tax Administration: Evidence from Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1307, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal federalism; tax arrears; transition economies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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