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An Experimental Analysis of Modifications to the Centralized Milk Quota Exchange System in Quebec

Author

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  • Maurice Doyon
  • Virginie Simard
  • Kent D. Messer
  • Lota D. Tamini
  • Harry M. Kaiser

Abstract

Using experimental economics, this paper tests the potential impacts of modifying the centralized quota exchange system in Quebec with the intent of decreasing the quota price while minimizing negative impacts on auction effectiveness. Two separate treatments are applied to a uniform price auction similar to that employed in Quebec. The first treatment is an exclusion (5% or 15%) of the highest buyer bids and seller offers. The second is a tax (2% or 10%) on all units offered for sale that remain unsold. Various combinations of the two treatments are also tested. The results suggest that exclusion of the highest bids and offers can decrease the price of the quota and that a 15% exclusion rate is more effective than a 5% rate. The tax alone has little impact on quota price. The combination of the two treatments generates a more marked reduction in both the number of exchanges and the price of the quota than when the tax or the exclusion is applied individually. However, the combination of treatments results in a greater loss of economic efficiency. In all cases, relatively small market price reductions are realized at the expense of substantial losses in economic efficiency. La présente étude teste de manière expérimentale la capacité d'une modification au système centralisé de vente du quota à faire diminuer le prix du quota laitier au Québec tout en minimisant les impacts négatifs des changements sur l'efficacité de l'enchère. Cette modification consiste à appliquer deux traitements sur l'enchère de prix uniforme où s'échange le quota. Le premier traitement consiste en une exclusion (5% ou 15%) des mises les plus élevées des acheteurs et des vendeurs. Le second traitement est une taxe (2% ou 10%) appliquée aux unités que les vendeurs mettent en marché et ne réussissent pas à vendre. Différentes combinaisons de ces deux traitements sont également testées. Les données générées permettent de conclure que le mécanisme d'exclusion des mises les plus élevées permet de faire diminuer le prix du quota, l'exclusion de 15%étant plus efficace que celle de 5%. Pour sa part, la taxe seule a peu d'impact sur le prix du quota tandis que la combinaison des deux traitements entraîne une diminution du nombre de transactions et du prix du quota plus marquée que lorsque les traitements de taxe et d'exclusion sont appliqués individuellement. Cela a comme corollaire d'entraîner une perte d'efficacitééconomique plus importante. Dans tous les cas, des baisses de prix de marché relativement modestes sont réalisées au coût d'importantes pertes d'efficacitééconomique.

Suggested Citation

  • Maurice Doyon & Virginie Simard & Kent D. Messer & Lota D. Tamini & Harry M. Kaiser, 2008. "An Experimental Analysis of Modifications to the Centralized Milk Quota Exchange System in Quebec," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 56(3), pages 295-312, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:canjag:v:56:y:2008:i:3:p:295-312
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1744-7976.2008.00130.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Antonio Alvarez & Carlos Arias & Luis Orea, 2006. "Explaining Differences in Milk Quota Values: The Role of Economic Efficiency," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(1), pages 182-193.
    2. Bogetoft, Peter & Jensen, Peter Max Friis & Nielsen, Kurt & Olesen, Henrik Ballebye & Olsen, Rene H., 2002. "Single Bid Restriction in Milk Quota Exchanges - Comparing the Danish and the Ontario Exchanges," Unit of Economics Working Papers 24181, Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Food and Resource Economic Institute.
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    15. Maurice A. Doyon, 2001. "The Effect of the Elimination of Federal Milk Marketing Orders on Farm-level Markets: A Laboratory Experiment," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 49(3), pages 353-374, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Elskamp, Rebecca & Hailu, Getu, 2013. "Do Efficient Dairy Producers Purchase Quota?," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 149678, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    2. Brümmer, Bernhard & Loy, Jens-Peter & Requate, Till, 2010. "Auction Experiments and Simulations of Milk Quota Exchanges," 2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado 61304, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

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