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On Economics: A Review of Why Nations Fail by D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson and Pillars of Prosperity by T. Besley and T. Persson

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  • W. Bentley MacLeod

Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to review the books Why Nations Fail by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, and Pillars of Prosperity by Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson. The essay briefly discusses the main contributions of the books and the role of politics for economic performance. The review then discusses these contributions in the light of recent research on organizational economics, particularly the modern theory of the firm. (JEL D23, D72, O10, O47, O57)

Suggested Citation

  • W. Bentley MacLeod, 2013. "On Economics: A Review of Why Nations Fail by D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson and Pillars of Prosperity by T. Besley and T. Persson," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 116-143, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:51:y:2013:i:1:p:116-43
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.51.1.116
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    3. Wu, Jiabin, 2016. "Political Institutions and Preference Evolution," MPRA Paper 69597, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Juan Pérez Velasco Pavón, 2014. "Economic behavior of indigenous peoples: the Mexican case," Latin American Economic Review, Springer;Centro de Investigaciòn y Docencia Económica (CIDE), vol. 23(1), pages 1-58, December.
    5. Arrouna Keita & Camelia Turcu, 2020. "Natural Resource Discoveries and Fiscal Discipline," Working Papers 2020.07, International Network for Economic Research - INFER.
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    7. Fahn, Matthias & MacLeod, W. Bentley & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2023. "Past and Future Developments in the Economics of Relational Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 16427, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Aoki, Masahiko, 2014. "Economic and Political Transitions from Premodern to Modern States in the Meiji Restoration and Xinhai Revolution: A Strategic Approach," ADBI Working Papers 486, Asian Development Bank Institute.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O47 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
    • O57 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries

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