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Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know

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  • Dow, Gregory K.
  • Putterman, Louis

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  • Dow, Gregory K. & Putterman, Louis, 2000. "Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 319-336, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:43:y:2000:i:3:p:319-336
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