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Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment

Author

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  • César Martinelli
  • Susan W. Parker
  • Ana Cristina Pérez-Gea
  • Rodimiro Rodrigo

Abstract

We use a database generated by a policy intervention that incentivized learning as measured by standardized exams to investigate empirically the relationship between cheating by students and cash incentives to students and teachers. We adapt methods from the education measurement literature to calculate the extent of cheating and show that cheating is more prevalent under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students (versus no incentives or incentives only to teachers). We provide evidence suggesting that students may have learned to cheat, with the number of cheating students per classroom increasing over time under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students.

Suggested Citation

  • César Martinelli & Susan W. Parker & Ana Cristina Pérez-Gea & Rodimiro Rodrigo, 2018. "Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 298-325, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:10:y:2018:i:1:p:298-325
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150066
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    Cited by:

    1. Tang, Johnny Jiahao, 2020. "Individual heterogeneity and cultural attitudes in credence goods provision," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    2. Hübler, Olaf & Koch, Melanie & Menkhoff, Lukas & Schmidt, Ulrich, 2021. "Corruption and cheating: Evidence from rural Thailand," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    3. Barrera-Osorio, Felipe & Cilliers, Jacobus & Cloutier, Marie-Hélène & Filmer, Deon, 2022. "Heterogenous teacher effects of two incentive schemes: Evidence from a low-income country," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    4. Aksoy, Billur & Palma, Marco A., 2019. "The effects of scarcity on cheating and in-group favoritism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 100-117.
    5. Bilen, Eren & Matros, Alexander, 2021. "Online cheating amid COVID-19," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 196-211.
    6. Gary Charness & Celia Blanco-Jimenez & Lara Ezquerra & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, 2019. "Cheating, incentives, and money manipulation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(1), pages 155-177, March.
    7. Singh, Abhijeet & Berg, Petter, 2024. "Myths of official measurement: Limits to test-based education reforms with weak governance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    8. Alan, Sule & Ertac, Seda & Gumren, Mert, 2020. "Cheating and incentives in a performance context: Evidence from a field experiment on children," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 681-701.
    9. Julio J. Elías & Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, 2019. "Paying for Kidneys? A Randomized Survey and Choice Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(8), pages 2855-2888, August.
    10. Klijn, Flip & Mdaghri Alaoui, Mehdi & Vorsatz, Marc, 2022. "Academic integrity in on-line exams: Evidence from a randomized field experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    11. Berkhout, Emilie & Pradhan, Menno & Rahmawati, & Suryadarma, Daniel & Swarnata, Arya, 2024. "Using technology to prevent fraud in high stakes national school examinations: Evidence from Indonesia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    12. Billur Aksoy & Marco A. Palma, "undated". "The Effects of Scarcity on Cheating and In-Group Favoritism," Working Papers 20180918-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
    13. Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "Comportements (non) éthiques et stratégies morales," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 70(6), pages 1021-1046.
    14. Olaf Hübler & Melanie Koch & Lukas Menkhoff & Ulrich Schmidt, 2019. "Cheating and Corruption: Evidence from a Household Survey," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1826, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    15. Yue-Yi Hwa & Clare Leaver, 2021. "Management in education systems," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 37(2), pages 367-391.
    16. Olaf Hübler & Lukas Menkhoff & Ulrich Schmidt, 2018. "Who Is Cheating? The Role of Attendants, Risk Aversion, and Affluence," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1736, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    17. Sergio Longobardi & Patrizia Falzetti & Margherita Maria Pagliuca, 2018. "Quis custiodet ipsos custodes? How to detect and correct teacher cheating in Italian student data," Statistical Methods & Applications, Springer;Società Italiana di Statistica, vol. 27(3), pages 515-543, August.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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