IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pcc/pccumd/04hicss.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets

Author

Abstract

Profit-maximizing bidding in uniform price auction markets involves bidding above marginal cost. It therefore is not surprising that such behavior is observed in electricity markets. This incentive to bid above marginal cost is not the result of coordinated action among the bidders. Rather, each bidder is independently selecting its bid to maximize profits based on its estimate of the residual demand curve it faces. The supplier bids a price for its energy capacity to optimize its marginal tradeoff between higher prices and lower quantities. Price response from either demand or other suppliers prevents the supplier from raising its bid too much. Profit maximizing bidding should be expected and encouraged by regulators. It is precisely this profit maximizing behavior that guides the market toward long-run efficient outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Cramton, 2004. "Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets," Papers of Peter Cramton 04hicss, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004.
    • Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04hicss
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2000-2004/cramton-bidding-behavior-in-electricity-markets-hawaii.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:cto:journl:v:21:y:2002:i:3:p:515-544 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
    3. Paul L. Joskow, 1997. "Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 119-138, Summer.
    4. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1998. "Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 703-725, Winter.
    5. Bushnell, James & Wolfram, Catherine, 2008. "Electricity Markets," Staff General Research Papers Archive 31547, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    6. Severin Borenstein & James B. Bushnell & Frank A. Wolak, 2002. "Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1376-1405, December.
    7. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-1277, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nicolosi, S., 2010. "Wind power integration, negative prices and power system flexibility - An empirical analysis of extreme events in Germany," MPRA Paper 31834, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Heim, Sven & Götz, Georg, 2021. "Do Pay-As-Bid Auctions Favor Collusion? Evidence from Germany's market for reserve power," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    3. Nicolosi, Marco, 2010. "Wind power integration and power system flexibility-An empirical analysis of extreme events in Germany under the new negative price regime," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(11), pages 7257-7268, November.
    4. Peter Cramton & Emmanuele Bobbio & David Malec & Pat Sujarittanonta, 2022. "Electricity Markets in Transition: A Multi-Decade Micro-Model of Entry and Exit in Advanced Wholesale Markets," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 183, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    5. Holmberg, Pär & Tangerås, Thomas & Ahlqvist, Victor, 2018. "Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity Markets," Working Paper Series 1257, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 27 Mar 2019.
    6. Lin-Ju Chen & Lei Zhu & Ying Fan & Sheng-Hua Cai, 2013. "Long-Term Impacts of Carbon Tax and Feed-in Tariff Policies on China's Generating Portfolio and Carbon Emissions: A Multi-Agent-Based Analysis," Energy & Environment, , vol. 24(7-8), pages 1271-1293, December.
    7. Hunt Allcott, 2012. "The Smart Grid, Entry, and Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets," NBER Working Papers 18071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Simona Bigerna & Carlo Andrea Bollino & Maria Chiara D’Errico & Paolo Polinori, 2023. "A new design for market power monitoring in the electricity market. A simulation for Italy," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 40(1), pages 285-317, April.
    9. Bigerna, Simona & Bollino, Carlo Andrea & D'Errico, Maria Chiara & Polinori, Paolo, 2017. "The Ideal Competitive Electricity Market. A simulation for Italy," MPRA Paper 94893, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Liebl, Dominik, 2010. "Modeling hourly Electricity Spot Market Prices as non stationary functional times series," MPRA Paper 25017, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Bustos-Salvagno, Javier, 2015. "Bidding behavior in the Chilean electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 288-299.
    12. Maria Chiara D?Errico, 2020. "Competition in the Italian electricity market: The unforeseen social welfare losses of reform," ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2020(2), pages 75-91.
    13. Ali Hortacsu & Steven L. Puller, 2005. "Understanding Strategic Bidding in Restructured Electricity Markets: A Case Study of ERCOT," NBER Working Papers 11123, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Romano, E. & Mutschler, R. & Hollmuller, P. & Sulzer, M. & Orehounig, K. & Rüdisüli, M., 2024. "Spatial carbon and price spillovers among EU countries on their pathway toward net-zero electricity supply," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    15. Kim, Hyunsook & Kim, Sung-Soo, 2010. "The optimal fuel mix and redistribution of social surplus in the Korean power market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(12), pages 7929-7938, December.
    16. Maurice Doyon & Lota Tamini & Virginie Simard & Kent Messer & Harry M. Kaiser, 2006. "L'économie expérimentale pour l'analyse de modifications au système centralisé de vente du quota laitier au Québec," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-23, CIRANO.
    17. Jae-Do Song & Young-Hwan Ahn, 2021. "Price Discovery of Consignment Auctions for Emission Permits," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-13, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Peter Cramton, 2003. "Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment of Submissions of the California Parties," Papers of Peter Cramton 03ferc2, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2003.
    2. Albert Banal-Estañol & Augusto Rupérez Micola, 2009. "Composition of Electricity Generation Portfolios, Pivotal Dynamics, and Market Prices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(11), pages 1813-1831, November.
    3. Aitor Ciarreta & María Espinosa, 2010. "Market power in the Spanish electricity auction," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 42-69, February.
    4. Nicholas Shunda, 2005. "Strategic Behavior in Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets for Electricity: Offer Cost or Payment Cost Minimization?," Working papers 2005-48, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    5. Moritz Bohland & Sebastian Schwenen, 2020. "Technology Policy and Market Structure: Evidence from the Power Sector," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1856, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    6. Fabra, Natalia & Toro, Juan, 2005. "Price wars and collusion in the Spanish electricity market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 155-181, April.
    7. Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2021. "Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    8. Crawford, Gregory S. & Crespo, Joseph & Tauchen, Helen, 2007. "Bidding asymmetries in multi-unit auctions: Implications of bid function equilibria in the British spot market for electricity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1233-1268, December.
    9. Erin T. Mansur, 2007. "Do Oligopolists Pollute Less? Evidence From A Restructured Electricity Market," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 661-689, December.
    10. Fabra, Natalia & de Frutos, Maria-Angeles, 2008. "On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6756, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Jorge Balat & Juan E. Carranza & Juan D. Martin, 2015. "Dynamic and Strategic Behavior in Hydropower-Dominated Electricity Markets: Empirical Evidence for Colombia," Borradores de Economia 886, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    12. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    13. Varawala, Lamia & Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza & Dán, György & Bunn, Derek & Rosellón, Juan, 2023. "A pricing mechanism to jointly mitigate market power and environmental externalities in electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    14. Zhang, Ning, 2009. "Generators' bidding behavior in the NYISO day-ahead wholesale electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 897-913, November.
    15. Carlos Suarez, 2021. "Mixed Oligopoly and Market Power Mitigation: Evidence from the Colombian Wholesale Electricity Market," IREA Working Papers 202101, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jan 2021.
    16. Ahmed Anwar, 2006. "Single or Multiple Pricing in Electricity Pools?," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 143, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    17. Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis‐Christou & Arthur Schram, 2008. "Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 192-214, January.
    18. de Frutos, María-Ángeles & Fabra, Natalia, 2012. "How to allocate forward contracts: The case of electricity markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 451-469.
    19. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Dormady, Noah C., 2014. "Carbon auctions, energy markets & market power: An experimental analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 468-482.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Electricity Auctions; Market Design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04hicss. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Cramton (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cramton.umd.edu .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.