IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pcc/pccumd/10cgsma.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

An Auction for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment: Evidence from an Industry Mock Auction

Author

Abstract

On 1 April 2011, 110 stakeholders in the Medicare Durable Medical Equipment (DME) industry came to the University of Maryland to discuss how the CMS’ current competitive bidding program could be improved. The participants included Medicare providers, government leaders, and auction experts. A major part of the event was the conduct of a mock auction based on the auction design proposed in Cramton (2011a). This design addresses the fatal flaws in the CMS design (Letter from experts 2010, 2011). The proposed design has been shown to be highly effective in theory (Cramton et al. 2011), in the experimental lab (Merlob et al. 2010), and in practice (Ausubel and Cramton 2004, 2006). This paper presents the mock auction results. The mock auction demonstrated the feasibility of the proposal as well as its excellent performance. Despite the complex bidding environment, the mock auction achieved high levels of economic efficiency: 97% of the potential gains from trade were realized. Moreover, the participants were able to understand the auction format and auction platform, and successfully execute bidding strategies for 6 products in 9 regions, all in a matter of hours. The conference also demonstrated the advantages of advancing the Medicare auctions through collaboration among industry, government, and auction experts. To avoid program failure, the Medicare auctions must be reformed to take advantage of modern auction methods. The mock auction demonstrates the high efficiency of the proposed approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Cramton & Ulrich Gall & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta, 2012. "An Auction for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment: Evidence from an Industry Mock Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 10cgsma, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
  • Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10cgsma
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2010-2014/cramton-gall-sujarittanonta-industry-mock-auction-for-medicare-dme.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cramton Peter & Katzman Brett E, 2010. "Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 7(4), pages 1-4, October.
    2. Dimitri,Nicola & Piga,Gustavo & Spagnolo,Giancarlo (ed.), 2006. "Handbook of Procurement," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521870733, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Arvate, Paulo Roberto & Barbosa, Klênio & Gambardella, Dante, 2013. "Generic-branded drug competition and the price for pharmaceuticals in procurement auctions," Textos para discussão 333, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
    2. Peter Cramton, 2012. "Medicare Auction Reform," Papers of Peter Cramton 11marv, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    3. Ionel PREDA, 2019. "Analysis of Centralized Public Procurement in the European Union, the United States of America and Romania," REVISTA DE MANAGEMENT COMPARAT INTERNATIONAL/REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 20(4), pages 459-472, October.
    4. Anna Matas & Ginés de Rus & Stef Proost & Salvador Bertoméu-Sánchez & Antonio Estache, 2018. "The Financing of Infrastructure / La financiación de las infraestructuras / El finançament de les infraestructures," IEB Reports ieb_report_1_2018, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    5. Georghiou, Luke & Edler, Jakob & Uyarra, Elvira & Yeow, Jillian, 2014. "Policy instruments for public procurement of innovation: Choice, design and assessment," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 1-12.
    6. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Barbosa, Kleno, 2019. "Corrupting Cartels: An Overview of the Petrobras Case," SITE Working Paper Series 51, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, revised 30 Oct 2019.
    7. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Seres, Gyula, 2021. "Are strategies anchored?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    8. Jones, 2009. "Reforms to Promote Non-Price Factors in Public Works Procurement in Singapore," Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(1), pages 71-89, June.
    9. Butler, Jeffrey V. & Carbone, Enrica & Conzo, Pierluigi & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2020. "Past performance and entry in procurement: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 179-195.
    10. Hinloopen, Jeroen & Onderstal, Sander, 2014. "Going once, going twice, reported! Cartel activity and the effectiveness of antitrust policies in experimental auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 317-336.
    11. Iossa, Elisabetta & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie & Rey, Patrick, 2020. "Collusive Market Allocations," CEPR Discussion Papers 14563, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Amaral, Miguel & Saussier, Stéphane & Yvrande-Billon, Anne, 2009. "Auction procedures and competition in public services: The case of urban public transport in France and London," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 166-175, June.
    13. Clarissa Lotti & Arieda Muço & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Tommaso Valletti, 2024. "Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 347-366, August.
    14. Bergman, Mats A. & Johansson, Per & Lundberg, Sofia & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2016. "Privatization and quality: Evidence from elderly care in Sweden," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 109-119.
    15. Ionel PREDA, 2020. "Deficiencies and Proposals for Improving the Public Procurement System in Romania," REVISTA DE MANAGEMENT COMPARAT INTERNATIONAL/REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 21(1), pages 23-43, March.
    16. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2017. "Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 407-425, October.
    17. Jakob Edler & Luke Georghiou & Elvira Uyarra & Jillian Yeow, 2015. "The meaning and limitations of public procurement for innovation: a supplier’s experience," Chapters, in: Charles Edquist & Nicholas S Vonortas & Jon M Zabala-Iturriagagoitia & Jakob Edler (ed.), Public Procurement for Innovation, chapter 2, pages 35-64, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Chiara D’Alpaos & Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi & Sergio Vergalli, 2013. "Time overruns as opportunistic behavior in public procurement," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 110(1), pages 25-43, September.
    19. Kotowski, Maciej H., 2018. "On asymmetric reserve prices," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    20. Elisabetta Iossa & Patrick Rey & Michael Waterson, 2022. "Organising Competition for the Market," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 822-868.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Medicare auctions; health care auctions; procurement auctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10cgsma. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Cramton (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cramton.umd.edu .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.