IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pcc/pccumd/11iauc.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Incentive Auctions

Author

Abstract

A proposed auction design for incentive auctions is given. The two-sided auctions enable the exchange of spectrum from a low-value use, such as over-the-air TV broadcast, to a high-value use, such as mobile broadband. The approach is both simple and effective. The auction has three stages conducted in sequence: 1) a reverse auction to determine the supply curve for spectrum, 2) a repacking stage that determines a set of optimal repacking plans for freeing various amounts of contiguous spectrum nationwide, and 3) a forward auction for determining the demand curve for spectrum. The auction determines the parties that are giving up spectrum, reorganizes the remaining parties within the legacy band to free-up contiguous spectrum at least cost in a new band, and finally determines the assignment and pricing of the new band.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Cramton, 2012. "Incentive Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 11iauc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11iauc
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2010-2014/cramton-incentive-auctions.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; spectrum auctions; market design; package auction; clock auction; incentive auction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11iauc. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Cramton (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cramton.umd.edu .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.