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Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan

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Abstract

The Treasury proposes to invest $700 billion in mortgage-related securities to resolve the financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as reverse auctions to determine prices. A well-designed auction process can indeed be an effective tool for acquiring distressed assets at minimum cost to the taxpayer. However, a simplistic process could lead to higher cost and fewer securities purchased. It is critical for the auction process to be designed carefully.

Suggested Citation

  • Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2008. "Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan," Papers of Peter Cramton 08adcfrp, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2008.
  • Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08adcfrp
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    File URL: https://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2005-2009/ausubel-cramton-auction-for-rescue-plan.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Hillinger, Claude, 2008. "How to deal with the US financial crisis at no cost to the taxpayer," Discussion Papers in Economics 6929, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    2. Edoardo Gaffeo & Ronny Mazzocchi, 2019. "“The price is right”: using auction theory to enhance competition in the NPL market," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(1), pages 104-112, March.
    3. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2008. "A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 08tara, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2008.
    4. Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2020. "A Universal Dynamic Auction for Unimodular Demand Types: An Efficient Auction Design for Various Kinds of Indivisible Commodities," Discussion Papers 20/08, Department of Economics, University of York.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; financial auctions; financial crisis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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