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Medicare Auction Reform

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Abstract

Chairwoman Ellmers, Ranking Member Richmond, and members of the House Committee on Small Business, I am honored to appear before you today and have this opportunity to speak to such a critical committee on a matter of great significance to our future: Medicare auction reform. Without the effective use of market methods to control costs and encourage efficient supply and demand, Medicare is unsustainable. This is why it is essential for Congress to step in and insist that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) replace its fatally-flawed competitive bidding program for Durable Medical Equipment with a modern auction based on best-practice and science (see Market Pricing Program Summary 2012). CMS has had ten years to adopt a sensible auction, but has refused to do so. Congress must give CMS more specific instructions.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Cramton, 2012. "Medicare Auction Reform," Papers of Peter Cramton 12cmaft, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12cmaft
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cramton Peter & Katzman Brett E, 2010. "Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 7(4), pages 1-4, October.
    2. Peter Cramton, 2012. "The Hidden Costs of a Flawed Medicare Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 12chcfma, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
    3. Brett Katzman & Kerry Anne McGeary, 2008. "Will Competitive Bidding Decrease Medicare Prices," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(3), pages 839-856, January.
    4. Peter Cramton & Sean Ellermeyer & Brett Katzman, 2015. "Designed To Fail: The Medicare Auction For Durable Medical Equipment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 469-485, January.
    5. Dimitri,Nicola & Piga,Gustavo & Spagnolo,Giancarlo (ed.), 2006. "Handbook of Procurement," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521870733, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Medicare auctions; health care auctions; procurement auctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

    NEP fields

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