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Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Hiller, Victor & Wu, Jiabin & Zhang, Hanzhe, 2023. "Marital preferences and stable matching in cultural evolution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
  2. Ortega, Josué & Klein, Thilo, 2023. "The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 515-528.
  3. Yash Kanoria & Seungki Min & Pengyu Qian, 2020. "The Competition for Partners in Matching Markets," Papers 2006.14653, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
  4. Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2019. "Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 155-190, August.
  5. Josu'e Ortega, 2018. "The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large," Papers 1810.10287, arXiv.org.
  6. Ismail Saglam, 2020. "Measuring external stability in one-to-one matching," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(1), pages 234-247.
  7. Thilo Klein & Robert Aue & Josue Ortega, 2020. "School choice with independent versus consolidated districts," Papers 2006.13209, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
  8. Sperisen, Benjamin & Wiseman, Thomas, 2020. "Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 491-511.
  9. Pęski, Marcin, 2017. "Large roommate problem with non-transferable random utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 432-471.
  10. Michael Bates & Michael Dinerstein & Andrew C. Johnston & Isaac Sorkin, 2022. "Teacher Labor Market Equilibrium and Student Achievement," CESifo Working Paper Series 9551, CESifo.
  11. Akyol, Ethem, 2023. "Inefficiency of Random Serial Dictatorship under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  12. Ortega, Josue & Klein, Thilo, 2022. "Improving efficiency and equality in school choice," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-046, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  13. Michael Greinecker & Christopher Kah, 2018. "Pairwise stable matching in large economies," Graz Economics Papers 2018-01, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  14. Bonkoungou, Somouaoga & Nesterov, Alexander, 2023. "Incentives in matching markets: counting and comparing manipulating agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
  15. Alvin E. Roth, 2024. "Market Design and Maintenance," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2022. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 18-33, March.
  17. Estelle Cantillon, 2017. "Broadening the market design approach to school choice," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 613-634.
  18. Hector Chade & Jan Eeckhout & Lones Smith, 2017. "Sorting through Search and Matching Models in Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(2), pages 493-544, June.
  19. Ortega, Josué, 2019. "The losses from integration in matching markets can be large," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 48-51.
  20. Ce Liu, 2020. "Stability in Repeated Matching Markets," Papers 2007.03794, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
  21. Ashlagi, Itai & Gonczarowski, Yannai A., 2018. "Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 405-425.
  22. Aditya Kuvalekar & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2024. "A fair procedure in a marriage market," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(3), pages 533-550, September.
  23. Nick Arnosti, 2022. "A Continuum Model of Stable Matching With Finite Capacities," Papers 2205.12881, arXiv.org.
  24. Kristian Koerselman, 2020. "Why Finnish polytechnics reject top applicants," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(5), pages 491-507, September.
  25. Piazza, Adriana & Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo, 2024. "Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 321-339.
  26. Aue, Robert & Bach, Maximilian & Heigle, Julia & Klein, Thilo & Pfeiffer, Friedhelm & Zapp, Kristina, 2020. "The implication of school admission rules for segregation and educational inequality: Research report," ZEW Expertises, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 223254, March.
  27. Hanna Halaburda & Mikołaj Jan Piskorski & Pınar Yıldırım, 2018. "Competing by Restricting Choice: The Case of Matching Platforms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(8), pages 3574-3594, August.
  28. Itai Ashlagi & Mark Braverman & Amin Saberi & Clayton Thomas & Geng Zhao, 2020. "Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity," Papers 2009.05124, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2021.
  29. Nick Arnosti, 2023. "Lottery Design for School Choice," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 244-259, January.
  30. Linda Cai & Clayton Thomas, 2019. "Representing All Stable Matchings by Walking a Maximal Chain," Papers 1910.04401, arXiv.org.
  31. Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2019. "Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 155-190, August.
  32. Ethem Akyol, 2022. "Ex-Ante Welfare Superiority of the Boston Mechanism Over the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1189-1220, December.
  33. Gonczarowski, Yannai A. & Nisan, Noam & Ostrovsky, Rafail & Rosenbaum, Will, 2019. "A stable marriage requires communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 626-647.
  34. Leshno, Jacob D. & Pradelski, Bary S.R., 2021. "The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 62-78.
  35. Ashlagi, Itai & Nikzad, Afshin, 2020. "What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
  36. Saraiva, Gustavo, 2021. "An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 55-77.
  37. Ortega, Josué, 2018. "Social integration in two-sided matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 119-126.
  38. Galichon, Alfred & Ghelfi, Octavia & Henry, Marc, 2023. "Stable and extremely unequal," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
  39. Michael Greinecker & Christopher Kah, 2018. "Pairwise stable matching in large economies," Working Papers 2018-02, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
  40. Rheingans-Yoo, Ross, 2024. "Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 71-83.
  41. Simon Mauras, 2020. "Two-Sided Random Matching Markets: Ex-Ante Equivalence of the Deferred Acceptance Procedures," Papers 2005.08584, arXiv.org.
  42. Jiang, Shangrong & Li, Yuze & Wang, Shouyang & Zhao, Lin, 2022. "Blockchain competition: The tradeoff between platform stability and efficiency," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 296(3), pages 1084-1097.
  43. SangMok Lee & Leeat Yariv, 2018. "On the Efficiency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets," Working Papers 2018-4, Princeton University. Economics Department..
  44. Liu, Ce, 2023. "Stability in repeated matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
  45. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Clayton Thomas, 2022. "Structural Complexities of Matching Mechanisms," Papers 2212.08709, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
  46. Itai Ashlagi & Mark Braverman & Geng Zhao, 2023. "Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets," Papers 2302.08599, arXiv.org.
  47. Ashlagi, Itai & Nikzad, Afshin & Romm, Assaf, 2019. "Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 167-187.
  48. Aue, Robert & Klein, Thilo & Ortega, Josué, 2020. "What happens when separate and unequal school districts merge?," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-032, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  49. Gutin, Gregory Z. & Neary, Philip R. & Yeo, Anders, 2023. "Unique stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 529-547.
  50. Michael Greinecker & Christopher Kah, 2021. "Pairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2929-2974, November.
  51. Wu, Qingyun, 2020. "Entering classes in the college admissions model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 579-587.
  52. Mohammad Akbarpour & Yeganeh Alimohammadi & Shengwu Li & Amin Saberi, 2021. "The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets," Papers 2104.03219, arXiv.org.
  53. Pittel, Boris, 2018. "On random exchange-stable matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 1-13.
  54. Benjamin N. Roth & Ran I. Shorrer, 2021. "Making Marketplaces Safe: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 3694-3713, June.
  55. Kenny Peng & Nikhil Garg, 2023. "Monoculture in Matching Markets," Papers 2312.09841, arXiv.org.
  56. Boris Pittel, 2019. "On Likely Solutions of the Stable Matching Problem with Unequal Numbers of Men and Women," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 44(1), pages 122-146, February.
  57. Kenny Peng & Nikhil Garg, 2024. "Wisdom and Foolishness of Noisy Matching Markets," Papers 2402.16771, arXiv.org.
  58. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Ori Heffetz & Clayton Thomas, 2022. "Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions," Papers 2209.13148, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
  59. Itai Ashlagi & Mark Braverman & Yash Kanoria & Peng Shi, 2020. "Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2163-2193, May.
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