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A fair procedure in a marriage market

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  • Kuvalekar, Aditya Vijay

Abstract

We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields astable matching. Moreover, the outcome is often a non-extremal matching, and in fact, is a Rawlsian stable matching if the matching market is "balanced." Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, hence, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets in which fairness considerations are important.

Suggested Citation

  • Kuvalekar, Aditya Vijay, 2021. "A fair procedure in a marriage market," UC3M Working papers. Economics 31711, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:31711
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2006. "Procedurally fair and stable matching," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(2), pages 431-447, January.
    2. Itai Ashlagi & Yash Kanoria & Jacob D. Leshno, 2017. "Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(1), pages 69-98.
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    4. Manjunath, Vikram & Turhan, Bertan, 2016. "Two school systems, one district: What to do when a unified admissions process is impossible," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 25-40.
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    6. Chung-Piaw Teo & Jay Sethuraman, 1998. "The Geometry of Fractional Stable Matchings and Its Applications," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 23(4), pages 874-891, November.
    7. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-1480, November.
    8. Antonio Romero-Medina, 2005. "Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 305-324, May.
    9. Jay Sethuraman & Chung-Piaw Teo & Liwen Qian, 2006. "Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(3), pages 581-596, August.
    10. Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 456-468, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Dur, Umut, 2024. "Rawlsian Matching," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 101-106.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fair Procedure;

    JEL classification:

    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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