Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170115
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- Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé Iehlé, 2019. "Two-Sided Matching with (almost) One-Sided Preferences," Post-Print halshs-01513384, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Hu, Gaoji & Li, Jiangtao & Tang, Rui, 2020. "The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 305-318.
- Benoit Decerf & Guillaume Haeringer & Martin Van der Linden, 2024. "Incontestable Assignments," Papers 2401.03598, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
- Decerf, Benoit & Van der Linden, Martin, 2021. "Manipulability in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
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