Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations
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DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3265
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Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 411-433.
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- Hongchang Wang & Benjamin Williams & Karen Xie & Wei Chen, 2024. "Quality Differentiation and Matching Performance in Peer-to-Peer Markets: Evidence from Airbnb Plus," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(7), pages 4260-4282, July.
- Ni Huang & Gordon Burtch & Yumei He & Yili Hong, 2022. "Managing Congestion in a Matching Market via Demand Information Disclosure," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1196-1220, December.
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- Patel, Pankaj C. & Oghazi, Pejvak & Arunachalam, S., 2023. "Does consumer privacy act influence firm performance in the retail industry? Evidence from a US state-level law change," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
- Kenny Peng & Nikhil Garg, 2024. "Wisdom and Foolishness of Noisy Matching Markets," Papers 2402.16771, arXiv.org.
- Mylius, F., 2023. "Why Personal Ties (Still) Matter: Referrals and Congestion," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2356, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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Keywords
marketplace and platform design; communication complexity; stable matching; match recommendations; informative signaling;All these keywords.
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