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Is No. News Bad News? Information Transmission and the Role of "Early Warning" in the Principal-Agent Model

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Roman Inderst & Manuel Klein, 2007. "Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 881-904, December.
  2. Dye, Ronald A. & Sridharan, Sri S., 2014. "Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 308-312.
  3. Eisfeldt, Andrea L. & Rampini, Adriano A., 2008. "Managerial incentives, capital reallocation, and the business cycle," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 177-199, January.
  4. Florian Heider & Roman Inderst, 2012. "Loan Prospecting," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(8), pages 2381-2415.
  5. Friebel, Guido & Raith, Michael, 2016. "Managers, Training, and Internal Labor Markets," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145666, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  6. Mikhail Drugov & Rocco Macchiavello, 2014. "Financing Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 315-349, February.
  7. Doh Shin Jeon, "undated". "Relying on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation," Economics Working Papers 623, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2006.
  8. Gerd Muehlheusser & Andreas Roider, 2004. "Black Sheep and Walls of Silence," Diskussionsschriften dp0410, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  9. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp, 2021. "Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation [Motivating Innovation in Newly Public Firms]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(3), pages 1253-1278.
  10. Inderst, Roman, 2009. "Innovation management in organizations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 871-887, November.
  11. Guillaume Roger, 2013. "Optimal Contract under Moral Hazard with Soft Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 55-80, November.
  12. Hendrik Hakenes & Friederike Schlegel, 2014. "I Spy with my Little Eye... a Banking Crisis - Early Warnings and Incentive Schemes in Banks," CESifo Working Paper Series 5140, CESifo.
  13. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020. "Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
  14. Rosellon Cifuentes, M.A., 1999. "Essays on financial policy, liquidation values and product markets," Other publications TiSEM 802f644e-3e93-4815-bf33-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  15. Feess, Eberhard & Walzl, Markus, 2004. "Delegated expertise--when are good projects bad news?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 77-82, January.
  16. Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2007. "Optimal organization in a sequential investment problem with the principal's cancellation option," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 631-641, June.
  17. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Information Transmission in Hierarchies," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01491930, HAL.
  18. Brett Green & Curtis R. Taylor, 2016. "Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and Self-Reported Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(12), pages 3660-3699, December.
  19. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2014. "Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 1069-1078, June.
  20. Marco Pagano & Giovanni Immordino, 2012. "Corporate Fraud, Governance, and Auditing," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 109-133.
  21. Corinne Langinier & Philippe Marcoul, 2016. "The Search of Prior Art and the Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(3), pages 399-427, November.
  22. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
  23. Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
  24. Mikhail Drugov & Rocco Macchiavello, 2014. "Financing Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 315-349, February.
  25. Baliga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Optimal Design of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 27-51, Spring.
  26. Laux, Volker & Ray, Korok, 2020. "Effects of accounting conservatism on investment efficiency and innovation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1).
  27. Roman Inderst & Sebastian Pfeil, 2013. "Securitization and Compensation in Financial Institutions," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(4), pages 1323-1364.
  28. Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2014. "Delegating the decision-making authority to terminate a sequential project," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 178-194.
  29. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  30. Guillaume Roger, 2013. "Moral Hazard with Discrete Soft Information," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 89(287), pages 545-555, December.
  31. Volker Laux, 2010. "On the benefits of allowing CEOs to time their stock option exercises," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 118-138, March.
  32. Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2007. "Patents, Search of Prior Art, and Revelation of Information," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10489, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  33. Doh-Shin Jeon, 2003. "A Theory of Information Flows," Working Papers 77, Barcelona School of Economics.
  34. Mitusch, Kay, 2006. "Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 507-525, August.
  35. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Information Transmission in Hierarchies," Post-Print halshs-01491930, HAL.
  36. Chade, Hector & Kovrijnykh, Natalia, 2016. "Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 55-92.
  37. Friebel, Guido & Raith, Michael, 2006. "Resource Allocation and Firm Scope," IZA Discussion Papers 2249, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  38. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 115-125, September.
  39. Shin, Dongsoo, 2008. "Information acquisition and optimal project management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 1032-1043, July.
  40. Nicole Bastian Johnson & Thomas Pfeiffer & Georg Schneider, 2013. "Multistage Capital Budgeting for Shared Investments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(5), pages 1213-1228, May.
  41. Schopohl, Simon, 2017. "Information transmission in hierarchies," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 570, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  42. Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2009. "Misselling through Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 883-908, June.
  43. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.
  44. Rohan Pitchford, 2001. "Deregulation," International and Development Economics Working Papers idec01-9, International and Development Economics.
  45. Steven Buccola & David Ervin & Hui Yang, 2009. "Research Choice and Finance in University Bioscience," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(4), pages 1238-1255, April.
  46. Volker Laux, 2015. "Executive Pay, Innovation, and Risk‐Taking," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 275-305, June.
  47. Jean-Etienne de Bettignies & Jan Zabojnik, 2019. "Information Sharing and Incentives in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 619-650.
  48. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 2014. "How to get banks to take less risk and disclose bad news," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 437-470.
  49. Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Marc Möller, 2013. "Decision–Making and Implementation in Teams," CEP Discussion Papers dp1208, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  50. Stanley Baiman & Mirko S. Heinle & Richard Saouma, 2013. "Multistage Capital Budgeting with Delayed Consumption of Slack," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 869-881, April.
  51. Inderst, Roman & Hoffmann, Florian & Opp, Marcus, 2014. "Regulating Deferred Incentive Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 9877, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  52. Finkle Aaron & Shin Dongsoo, 2010. "Disregarding the Attorney's Advice: An Agency Perspective," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 197-217, September.
  53. Anil Arya & John Fellingham & Hans Frimor & Brian Mittendorf, 2006. "On the Role of Receivables in Managing Salesforce Incentives," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 311-324.
  54. Guido Friebel & Michael Raith, 2010. "Resource Allocation and Organizational Form," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 1-33, May.
  55. Inderst, Roman, 2012. "Job Protection vs. Contracts At-Will: Trading-off Entrenchment and Shirking," MPRA Paper 53851, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  56. Gneezy, Uri & Gravert, Christina & Saccardo, Silvia & Tausch, Franziska, 2017. "A must lie situation – avoiding giving negative feedback," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 445-454.
  57. Stanley Baiman & Mirko S. Heinle & Richard Saouma, 2021. "Allocating Resources with Nonmonotonic Returns," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 3239-3253, May.
  58. Marcoul, Philippe, 2003. "A Theory of Advice Based on Information Search Incentives," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10357, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  59. Van Wesep, Edward D. & Wang, Sean, 2014. "The prevention of excess managerial risk taking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 579-593.
  60. Volker Laux, 2008. "Board Independence and CEO Turnover," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 137-171, March.
  61. Yucel, Eray, 2011. "A Review and Bibliography of Early Warning Models," MPRA Paper 32893, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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