IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/randje/v41y2010i1p118-138.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the benefits of allowing CEOs to time their stock option exercises

Author

Listed:
  • Volker Laux

Abstract

This article examines the costs and benefits of permitting executives to use inside information to time their stock option exercises. Whereas prior research has focused on the negative effects of timing discretion, I show that such discretion can have beneficial incentive effects in that it leads to improved project abandonment decisions. This result follows because at‐the‐money options used to induce managerial effort tilt the CEO's preferences toward project continuation. When the CEO is free to unload stock options at will, he will do so exactly in those states where the continuation bias is most detrimental (i.e., in the event of bad news), making the CEO willing to abandon the project.

Suggested Citation

  • Volker Laux, 2010. "On the benefits of allowing CEOs to time their stock option exercises," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 118-138, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:41:y:2010:i:1:p:118-138
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00092.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00092.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00092.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hall, Brian J. & Murphy, Kevin J., 2002. "Stock options for undiversified executives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-42, February.
    2. Ke, Bin & Huddart, Steven & Petroni, Kathy, 2003. "What insiders know about future earnings and how they use it: Evidence from insider trades," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 315-346, August.
    3. Baiman, S & Verrecchia, RE, 1996. "The relation among capital markets, financial disclosure, production efficiency, and insider trading," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1), pages 1-22.
    4. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse & Walker, David I, 2002. "Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Seyhun, H. Nejat, 1986. "Insiders' profits, costs of trading, and market efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 189-212, June.
    6. Baiman, Stanley & Verrecchia, Robert E., 1995. "Earnings and price-based compensation contracts in the presence of discretionary trading and incomplete contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 93-121, July.
    7. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fershtman, Chaim, 1993. "The effects of insider trading on insiders effort in good and bad times," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 469-481, November.
    8. Seyhun, H Nejat, 1992. "The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 149-182, April.
    9. Glosten, Lawrence R. & Milgrom, Paul R., 1985. "Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 71-100, March.
    10. Dye, Ronald A, 1984. "Inside Trading and Incentives," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(3), pages 295-313, July.
    11. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    12. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
    13. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fershtman, Chaim, 1994. "Insider Trading and the Managerial Choice among Risky Projects," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-14, March.
    14. Steven D. Levitt & Christopher M. Snyder, 1997. "Is No. News Bad News? Information Transmission and the Role of "Early Warning" in the Principal-Agent Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 641-661, Winter.
    15. Huddart, Steven & Lang, Mark, 2003. "Information distribution within firms: evidence from stock option exercises," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-3), pages 3-31, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jan Zabojnik, 2014. "Stock-based Compensation Plans And Employee Incentives," Working Paper 1325, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    2. Laux, Volker, 2012. "Stock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 513-526.
    3. Meg Adachi-Sato, 2013. "Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement ," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-890, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    4. Yoon, Dae-Hee, 2018. "Strategic delegation, stock options, and investment hold-up problems," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-14.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael Firth & T. Y. Leung & Oliver M. Rui, 2011. "Insider Trading in Hong Kong: Tests of Stock Returns and Trading Frequency," Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies (RPBFMP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(03), pages 505-533.
    2. Skaife, Hollis A. & Veenman, David & Wangerin, Daniel, 2013. "Internal control over financial reporting and managerial rent extraction: Evidence from the profitability of insider trading," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 91-110.
    3. Chang, Millicent & Watson, Iain, 2015. "Delayed disclosure of insider trades: Incentives for and indicators of future performance?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(PA), pages 182-197.
    4. Steven J. Huddart & Bin Ke, 2007. "Information Asymmetry and Cross†sectional Variation in Insider Trading," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(1), pages 195-232, March.
    5. Frankel, Richard & Li, Xu, 2004. "Characteristics of a firm's information environment and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 229-259, June.
    6. Ryu, Doojin & Yang, Heejin & Yu, Jinyoung, 2022. "Insider trading and information asymmetry: Evidence from the Korea Exchange," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(PA).
    7. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Chaim Fershtman, 1990. "The Effects of Insider Trading on Insiders' Choice Among Risky Investment Projects," Discussion Papers 897, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Semih Tartaroglu & Michael Imhof, 2017. "Insider trading and response to earnings announcements: the impact of accelerated disclosure requirements," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 315-336, August.
    9. Chen, Shenglan & Ma, Hui & Wu, Qiang & Zhang, Hao, 2023. "Does common ownership constrain managerial rent extraction? Evidence from insider trading profitability," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    10. Pham, Man Duy (Marty), 2022. "Management friendship and insider opportunism," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    11. Guanming He & Helen Mengbing Ren & Richard Taffler, 2021. "Do corporate insiders trade on future stock price crash risk?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1561-1591, May.
    12. Wisniewski, Tomasz P., 2004. "Reexamination of the link between insider trading and price efficiency," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 209-228, June.
    13. Jin, Li & Kothari, S.P., 2008. "Effect of personal taxes on managers' decisions to sell their stock," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 23-46, September.
    14. Cheng, Lin & Jin, Qinglu & Ma, Hui, 2023. "Tone emphasis and insider trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    15. Dean Katselas, 2020. "Strategic insider trading around earnings announcements in Australia," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(4), pages 3709-3741, December.
    16. Darren T. Roulstone, 2003. "The Relation Between Insider‐Trading Restrictions and Executive Compensation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 525-551, June.
    17. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Chaim Fershtman, 1990. "The Effect of Insider Trading on Insiders' Reaction to Opportunities to 'Waste' Corporate Value," Discussion Papers 889, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    18. Wei Zhang & Steven F. Cahan & Arthur C. Allen, 2005. "Insider Trading and Pay-Performance Sensitivity: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(9-10), pages 1887-1919.
    19. Wang, Kun Tracy & Wang, Wanbin Walter, 2017. "Competition in the stock market with asymmetric information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 40-49.
    20. Yonghong Jia & Xinghua Gao, 2021. "Is managerial rent extraction associated with tax aggressiveness? Evidence from informed insider trading," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 423-452, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:41:y:2010:i:1:p:118-138. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/randdus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.