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Multistage Capital Budgeting with Delayed Consumption of Slack

Author

Listed:
  • Stanley Baiman

    (University of Bocconi, 20141 Milan, Italy; and The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104)

  • Mirko S. Heinle

    (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104)

  • Richard Saouma

    (UCLA Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California 90095)

Abstract

Capital budgeting frequently involves multiple stages at which firms can continue or abandon ongoing projects. In this paper, we study a project requiring two stages of investment. Failure to fund Stage 1 of the investment precludes investment in Stage 2, whereas failure to fund Stage 2 results in early termination. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the firm can limit the manager's informational rents with the early termination of the project. In this setting, we find that the firm optimally commits to a capital allocation scheme whereby it forgoes positive net present value (NPV) projects at Stage 1 (capital rationing), whereas at Stage 2, depending on the manager's previous report, it sometimes implements projects with a negative continuation NPV but in other situations forgoes implementing projects with positive continuation NPVs. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting.

Suggested Citation

  • Stanley Baiman & Mirko S. Heinle & Richard Saouma, 2013. "Multistage Capital Budgeting with Delayed Consumption of Slack," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 869-881, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:59:y:2013:i:4:p:869-881
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1621
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Katrin Weiskirchner-Merten, 2020. "Interdependence, participation, and coordination in the budgeting process," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 13(1), pages 247-274, April.
    2. Nicole Bastian Johnson & Thomas Pfeiffer & Georg Schneider, 2013. "Multistage Capital Budgeting for Shared Investments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(5), pages 1213-1228, May.
    3. Nicole Bastian Johnson & Thomas Pfeiffer & Georg Schneider, 2017. "Two-stage capital budgeting, capital charge rates, and resource constraints," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 933-963, June.
    4. Xiaojing Meng & Jie Joyce Tian, 2020. "Board Expertise and Executive Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5448-5464, November.
    5. Stanley Baiman & Mirko S. Heinle & Richard Saouma, 2021. "Allocating Resources with Nonmonotonic Returns," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 3239-3253, May.

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