Optimal Contract under Moral Hazard with Soft Information
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.4.55
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- Guillaume Roger, 2011. "Optimal contract under moral hazard with soft information," Discussion Papers 2012-12, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
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Cited by:
- Guillaume Roger, 2013.
"Moral Hazard with Discrete Soft Information,"
The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 89(287), pages 545-555, December.
- Guillaume Roger, 2011. "Moral hazard with discrete soft information," Discussion Papers 2012-13, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Shalpegin, Timofey, 2020. "Collaborative product development: Managing supplier incentives for key component testing," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 285(2), pages 553-565.
- Guillaume Roger, 2016. "A Revelation Mechanism for Soft Information under Moral Hazard," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(5), pages 752-763, October.
- Versano, Tsahi, 2021. "Silence can be golden: On the value of allowing managers to keep silent when information is soft," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2).
- Keeyoung Rhee, 2021. "Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard and Costly Lying," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 37, pages 115-140.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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