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Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay

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  • Roman Inderst
  • Manuel Klein

Abstract

We analyze how two key managerial tasks interact: that of growing the business through creating new investment opportunities and that of providing accurate information about these opportunities in the corporate budgeting process. We show how this interaction endogenously biases managers toward overinvesting in their own projects. This bias is exacerbated if managers compete for limited resources in an internal capital market, which provides us with a novel theory of the boundaries of the firm. Finally, managers of more risky and less profitable divisions should obtain steeper incentives to facilitate efficient investment decisions.
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  • Roman Inderst & Manuel Klein, 2007. "Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 881-904, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:38:y:2007:i:4:p:881-904
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    3. Orman, Cuneyt, 2015. "Organization of innovation and capital markets," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 94-114.
    4. Hsiao-Fen Hsiao & Tingyong Zhong & Hasan Dincer, 2019. "Analysing Managers’ Financial Motivation for Sustainable Investment Strategies," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(14), pages 1-22, July.
    5. Brüggen, Alexander & Luft, Joan, 2011. "Capital rationing, competition, and misrepresentation in budget forecasts," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 36(7), pages 399-411.
    6. Volker Laux, 2015. "Executive Pay, Innovation, and Risk‐Taking," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 275-305, June.
    7. Florian Englmaier & Matthias Fahn, 2015. "Size Matters - "Over"investments in a Relational Contracting Setting," CESifo Working Paper Series 5154, CESifo.
    8. Inderst, Roman, 2010. "Misselling (financial) products: The limits for internal compliance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 35-37, January.
    9. Inderst, Roman, 2009. "Innovation management in organizations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 871-887, November.
    10. Yun Song & Hongqu He & Caiyu Yan, 2022. "Impacts of top management team fault‐line on firm's innovation—Financial slack over‐investment and underinvestment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3348-3360, December.
    11. Roman Inderst & Holger M. Mueller & Felix Münnich, 2006. "Financing a Portfolio of Projects," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(4), pages 1289-1325.
    12. Thomas Hellmann & Veikko Thiele, 2011. "Incentives and Innovation: A Multitasking Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 78-128, February.
    13. Sandro Brusco & Fausto Panunzi, 2020. "Internal financing, managerial compensation and multiple tasks," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 501-527, December.
    14. Englmaier, Florian & Fahn, Matthias, 2014. "Size Matters - “Over†investments in a Relational Contracting Setting," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 506, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    15. Krasteva, Silvana & Sharma, Priyanka & Wagman, Liad, 2015. "The 80/20 rule: Corporate support for innovation by employees," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 32-43.
    16. Schmidbauer, Eric, 2019. "Budget selection when agents compete," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 255-268.
    17. Dana Foarta & Takuo Sugaya, 2021. "The management of talent: Optimal contracting for selection and incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 49-77, March.
    18. Chen, Shenglan & Lin, Bingxuan & Lu, Rui & Ma, Hui, 2016. "Pay for accounting performance and R&D investment: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 142-153.
    19. Mehmet Nasih Tağ, 2022. "The Dark Side of Firm Diversity: An Empirical Examination of the Impact of Firm Diversity on Resource Allocation Efficiency in Multidivisional Firms," Istanbul Business Research, Istanbul University Business School, vol. 51(2), pages 643-668, November.

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