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The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Peter Leeson, 2014. "Pirates, prisoners, and preliterates: anarchic context and the private enforcement of law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 365-379, June.
  2. Calahorrano, Lena & an de Meulen, Philipp, 2010. "How to Tackle the Gulf of Aden Buccaneers," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010 31, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
  3. Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
  4. David Skarbek, 2010. "Putting the "Con" into Constitutions: The Economics of Prison Gangs," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 183-211.
  5. Ennio E. Piano & Louis Rouanet, 2024. "The calculus of american indian consent: the law and economics of tribal constitutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 199(3), pages 341-366, June.
  6. Peter Leeson, 2013. "Gypsy law," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 273-292, June.
  7. Freire, Danilo, 2017. "Prison Gangs," SocArXiv kuqqx, Center for Open Science.
  8. Escalante, Edwar E. & March, Raymond J., 2020. "Fighting on Christmas: brawling as self-governance in rural Peru," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(3), pages 355-368, June.
  9. Belasen, Ariel R. & Kutan, Ali M. & Belasen, Alan T., 2017. "The impact of unsuccessful pirate attacks on financial markets: Evidence in support of Leeson's reputation-building theory," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 344-351.
  10. Escalante, Edwar E., 2020. "Night watchers and terrorists," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 116-131.
  11. Peter T. Leeson & David B. Skarbek, 2010. "Criminal constitutions," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 279-297, August.
  12. Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2012. "Promoting Cooperation: the Distribution of Reward and Punishment Power," Discussion Papers 2012-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  13. Ennio E. Piano, 2018. "Outlaw and economics: Biker gangs and club goods," Rationality and Society, , vol. 30(3), pages 350-376, August.
  14. Peter T. Leeson & Daniel J. Smith & Nicholas A. Snow, 2012. "Hooligans," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 213-231.
  15. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2012. "Political Economy of Conflict Foreword," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 153-169.
  16. David Skarbek & Peng Wang, 2015. "Criminal rituals," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 288-305, October.
  17. Peter T Leeson, 2014. "Oracles," Rationality and Society, , vol. 26(2), pages 141-169, May.
  18. Guha, Brishti, 2012. "Pirates and fishermen: Is less patrolling always bad?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 29-38.
  19. Zanotti, Gabriel J. & Cachanosky, Nicolás, 2015. "Implications Of Machlup’S Interpretation Of Mises’S Epistemology," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 111-138, March.
  20. Marcus Matthias Keupp, 2021. "Efficiency of Military Performance," Springer Books, in: Defense Economics, chapter 0, pages 93-114, Springer.
  21. Carl Mildenberger, 2015. "Virtual world order: the economics and organizations of virtual pirates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 401-421, September.
  22. Edward Stringham, 2014. "It’s not me, it’s you: the functioning of Wall Street during the 2008 economic downturn," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(3), pages 269-288, December.
  23. Ennio E. Piano, 2017. "Free riders: the economics and organization of outlaw motorcycle gangs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(3), pages 283-301, June.
  24. Leeson, Peter T. & Coyne, Christopher J., 2012. "Sassywood," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 608-620.
  25. Leeson, Peter T. & Boettke, Peter J. & Lemke, Jayme S., 2014. "Wife Sales," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(4), pages 349-379, December.
  26. Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler, 2016. "Decentralization, institutions, and maritime piracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(3), pages 357-374, December.
  27. Rustam Romaniuc & Katherine Farrow & Lisette Ibanez & Alain Marciano, 2016. "The perils of government enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 161-182, January.
  28. Solomon Stein & Virgil Storr, 2013. "The difficulty of applying the economics of time and ignorance," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 26(1), pages 27-37, March.
  29. Marco Faillo & Stefania Ottone & Lorenzo Sacconi, 2015. "The social contract in the laboratory. An experimental analysis of self-enforcing impartial agreements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(3), pages 225-246, June.
  30. David Skarbek, 2024. "The political economy of criminal governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 1-24, July.
  31. Rustam Romaniuc & Katherine Farrow & Lisette Ibanez & Alain Marciano, 2016. "The perils of government enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 161-182, January.
  32. Peter T. Leeson & Douglas Bruce Rogers, 2012. "Organizing Crime," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 89-123.
  33. Richard H. McAdams, 2011. "The Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law," Chapters, in: Francesco Parisi (ed.), Production of Legal Rules, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  34. Andrew Young, 2015. "From Caesar to Tacitus: changes in early Germanic governance circa 50 BC-50 AD," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 357-378, September.
  35. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2012. "Avant-Propos," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 135-151.
  36. Alexander Salter, 2015. "Calhoun’s concurrent majority as a generality norm," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 375-390, September.
  37. Leeson, Peter T., 2010. "Rational choice, Round Robin, and rebellion: An institutional solution to the problems of revolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 297-307, March.
  38. Ph.D. Canditate Mathias ROYCE, 2010. "Philosophical Perspectives on the Social Contract Theory: Hobbes, Kant and Buchanan Revisited. A Comparison of Historical thought Surrounding the Philosophical Consequences of the Social Contract and ," Postmodern Openings, Editura Lumen, Department of Economics, vol. 4, pages 45-62, December.
  39. Christian Schubert & Leonhard K. Lades, 2014. "Fighting maritime piracy: three lessons from pompeius magnus," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(5), pages 481-497, October.
  40. Boettke, Peter J. & Coyne, Christopher J. & Leeson, Peter T., 2013. "Comparative historical political economy," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 285-301, September.
  41. Vladimir V. Maltsev, 2022. "Lessons from the Japanese ninja: on achieving a higher trade equilibrium under anarchy and private constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 433-444, December.
  42. Norgaard, Julia R. & Walbert, Harold J. & Hardy, R. August, 2018. "Shadow markets and hierarchies: comparing and modeling networks in the Dark Net," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(5), pages 877-899, October.
  43. Williamson, Claudia R., 2012. "Dignity and development," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 763-771.
  44. Andrew Young, 2022. "The Peace of God," Rationality and Society, , vol. 34(1), pages 28-55, February.
  45. Alexander Fink, 2011. "Under what conditions may social contracts arise? Evidence from the Hanseatic League," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 173-190, June.
  46. Daniel D’Amico, 2012. "Comparative political economy when anarchism is on the table," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 25(1), pages 63-75, March.
  47. Skarbek, David, 2020. "Qualitative research methods for institutional analysis," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(4), pages 409-422, August.
  48. Edward Peter Stringham, 2023. "Banking regulation got you down? The rise of fintech and cryptointermediation in Africa," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(3), pages 455-470, December.
  49. Claudia R. Williamson & Carrie B. Kerekes, 2011. "Securing Private Property: Formal versus Informal Institutions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 537-572.
  50. Daniel D’Amico, 2010. "The prison in economics: private and public incarceration in Ancient Greece," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 461-482, December.
  51. James Kostelnik & David Skarbek, 2013. "The governance institutions of a drug trafficking organization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 95-103, July.
  52. Guha, Brishti & Guha, Ashok S., 2011. "Pirates and traders: Some economics of pirate-infested seas," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 147-150, May.
  53. Leeson, Peter T., 2010. "Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 497-510, December.
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