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Free riders: the economics and organization of outlaw motorcycle gangs

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  • Ennio E. Piano

    (George Mason University)

Abstract

This paper investigates the organizational structure of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, one of the largest and best known North American motorcycle gangs. Within the first few decades since their establishment, the Angels developed a hierarchical organizational form, which allowed them to overcome internal conflict and exploit the gains from their involvement in criminal activities. This organizational form, I argue, played a central role in the rapid success of the Angels in the North American (and international) criminal landscape.

Suggested Citation

  • Ennio E. Piano, 2017. "Free riders: the economics and organization of outlaw motorcycle gangs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 171(3), pages 283-301, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:171:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0437-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0437-9
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    Cited by:

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    2. Ennio E. Piano, 2019. "State capacity and public choice: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 289-309, January.
    3. Piano, Ennio E. & Rouanet, Louis, 2020. "Desertion as theft," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 169-183, April.
    4. Aloys Prinz & Thomas Ehrmann, 2019. "Gang wars, gang employment and drug prices," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 37-46, April.
    5. Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Cabrales, Antonio, 2023. "Pricing group membership," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 114-121.
    6. David Skarbek, 2024. "The political economy of criminal governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 1-24, July.
    7. Norgaard, Julia R. & Walbert, Harold J. & Hardy, R. August, 2018. "Shadow markets and hierarchies: comparing and modeling networks in the Dark Net," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(5), pages 877-899, October.
    8. Vincent Geloso & Peter T. Leeson, 2020. "Are Anarcho-Capitalists Insane? Medieval Icelandic Conflict Institutions in Comparative Perspective," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 957-974.

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