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How to Tackle the Gulf of Aden Buccaneers

Author

Listed:
  • Calahorrano, Lena
  • an de Meulen, Philipp

Abstract

The surge of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden is often related to lawlessness and poverty in Somalia. We set up a simple model to describe the choice of becoming a pirate in a setting with an industrialized and a developing country which both engage in fishing in the same waters. As a result of fishing competition, maritime piracy as an alternative to fishing becomes more attractive in the developing country. We further investigate possible measures for the industrialized country to deal with piracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Calahorrano, Lena & an de Meulen, Philipp, 2010. "How to Tackle the Gulf of Aden Buccaneers," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010 31, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:gdec10:31
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Maritime Piracy; Expropriation; Migration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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