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Pirates, prisoners, and preliterates: anarchic context and the private enforcement of law

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  • Peter Leeson

Abstract

This paper investigates institutions that develop to strengthen or expand the discipline of continuous dealings as a mechanism for privately enforcing law. I consider three such institutions in three different anarchic contexts: that of Caribbean pirates; that of drug-dealing gangs and prison inmates; and that of preliterate tribesmen. These cases highlight several ways in which different anarchic contexts give rise to different private law enforcement institutions. The varieties of private law enforcement institutions that emerge in different anarchic contexts reflect the particular problem situations that persons who rely on those institutions confront in their attempts to protect property rights without government. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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  • Peter Leeson, 2014. "Pirates, prisoners, and preliterates: anarchic context and the private enforcement of law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 365-379, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:37:y:2014:i:3:p:365-379
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-013-9424-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Caleb S. Fuller, 2019. "Is the market for digital privacy a failure?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 353-381, September.
    4. Marciano, Alain & Ramello, Giovanni B., 2019. "Introduction to the symposium on the empirics of judicial institutions," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 73-80, February.
    5. Rustam Romaniuc & Katherine Farrow & Lisette Ibanez & Alain Marciano, 2016. "The perils of government enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 161-182, January.
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    7. Anja Shortland & Andrew Shortland, 2020. "Governance under the shadow of the law: trading high value fine art," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 157-174, July.
    8. Kurzfeld, Jonathan, 2024. "Strategic anarchy; a model of prison violence as a means to informal governance and rent extraction," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    9. Daniel J. D'Amico, 2017. "The Social Provision of Punishment and Incarceration," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(5), pages 1107-1132, November.
    10. Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler, 2016. "Decentralization, institutions, and maritime piracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(3), pages 357-374, December.
    11. Leonid Krasnozhon & John Levendis, 2018. "Weekend racer: cheating and self-governance in road racing," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 75-90, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anarchy; Self-governance; Discipline of continuous dealings; Pirates; Prison gangs; Preliterate societies; K40; K42; K49; Z13;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • K49 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Other
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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