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It’s not me, it’s you: the functioning of Wall Street during the 2008 economic downturn

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  • Edward Stringham

Abstract

Public officials have blamed Wall Street and its complex financial products for causing the 2008 economic downturn. This article addresses three popular claims saying that complex financial markets are at fault and need more regulation. It argues that even in the midst of a major economic downturn, the much-maligned mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps, and unregistered hedge funds functioned almost exactly as designed. When macroeconomic conditions worsened, firms and investors that were paid to assume certain risks had to assume them. Those that opted for safer investment vehicles with more levels of private protection faced fewer problems. Although many investment vehicles lost money, one must differentiate between problems that manifested themselves in markets and problems with the market itself. Even though government policies caused many of the problems, public officials always have an incentive to point the finger at Wall Street and to argue for more regulations when their policies negatively affect markets. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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  • Edward Stringham, 2014. "It’s not me, it’s you: the functioning of Wall Street during the 2008 economic downturn," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(3), pages 269-288, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:161:y:2014:i:3:p:269-288
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-014-0198-7
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    Cited by:

    1. Edward Stringham & Jack Vogel, 2018. "The leveraged invisible hand: how private equity enhances the market for corporate control and capitalism itself," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 223-244, October.

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