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Decentralization, institutions, and maritime piracy

Author

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  • Khusrav Gaibulloev

    (American University of Sharjah)

  • Todd Sandler

    (University of Texas at Dallas)

Abstract

Piracy is an organized crime that is not politically motivated; however, piracy has been linked consistently to the political environment and the quality of national institutions. Provincial governance considerations and spatial aspects may influence the emergence and sustainability of piratical activities. Unlike the extant literature, we investigate the impact of fiscal and political decentralization on the incidence of piracy, while accounting for the average distance to the coast of the nearest region to the pirate incident. Fiscal decentralization generally serves as a deterrent to piracy, while political decentralization may encourage or inhibit piracy. Political decentralization may deter piracy by providing policy ownership to local officials. Alternatively, decentralization may foster piracy by inhibiting interjurisdictional competition or by separating local governance from the national seat of power. In general, enhanced institutional quality limits piracy at both national and regional levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler, 2016. "Decentralization, institutions, and maritime piracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(3), pages 357-374, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:169:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0346-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0346-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Ursula E. Daxecker & Brandon C. Prins, 2016. "The politicization of crime: electoral competition and the supply of maritime piracy in Indonesia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(3), pages 375-393, December.
    2. Todd Sandler, 2016. "Political violence: an introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(3), pages 161-170, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Maritime piracy; Fiscal decentralization; Political decentralization; Institutional quality; Distance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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