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Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Hahn, Volker, 2011. "Sequential aggregation of verifiable information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1447-1454.
  2. Patrick Hummel, 2010. "Jury theorems with multiple alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(1), pages 65-103, January.
  3. Mandler, Michael, 2013. "How to win a large election," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 44-63.
  4. Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2014. "Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 25-28.
  5. Kohei Kawamura & Vasileios Vlaseros, 2015. "Expert Information and Majority Decisions," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 261, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  6. Kawamura, Kohei & Vlaseros, Vasileios, 2017. "Expert information and majority decisions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 77-88.
  7. Holm, Håkan, 2000. "Politically Correct Information Adoption," Working Papers 2000:5, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  8. Igerseim, Herrade & Baujard, Antoinette & Laslier, Jean-François, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 151-189, Mars-Juin.
  9. Roger Congleton, 2007. "Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 333-352, September.
  10. Johanna M. M. Goertz, 2019. "A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Large Poisson Elections with Multiple Alternatives," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-12, December.
  11. Sourav Bhattacharya, 2013. "Condorcet Jury Theorem in a Spatial Model of Elections," Working Paper 517, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Nov 2013.
  12. Krishna K Ladha, 2012. "Perfection of the Jury Rule by Rule-Reforming Voters," Working papers 103, Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode.
  13. Victoria Mooers & Joseph Campbell & Alessandra Casella & Lucas de Lara & Dilip Ravindran, 2022. "Liquid Democracy. Two Experiments on Delegation in Voting," Papers 2212.09715, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
  14. Sourav Bhattacharya & Paulo Barelli, 2013. "A Possibility Theorem on Information Aggregation in Elections," Working Paper 515, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2013.
  15. Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 169-191.
  16. Kohei Kawamura & Vasileios Vlaseros, 2024. "Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 475-492, June.
  17. Jean-François Laslier & Jörgen Weibull, 2008. "Committee decisions: Optimality and Equilibrium," Working Papers halshs-00121741, HAL.
  18. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Lauermann, Stephan, 2022. "Information aggregation in Poisson-elections," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(1), January.
  19. Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir, 2008. "Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002115, David K. Levine.
  20. Morton, Rebecca B. & Piovesan, Marco & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2019. "The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 461-481.
  21. GOERTZ, Johanna & MANIQUET, François, 2013. "Large elections with multiple alternatives: a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  22. J. Goertz, 2014. "Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 357-375, August.
  23. Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Khuller, Samir & Kraus, Sarit, 2001. "Optimal collective dichotomous choice under partial order constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 349-364, May.
  24. Giovanna M. Invernizzi, 2020. "Public Information: Relevance or Salience?," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-28, January.
  25. Meirowitz, Adam, 2004. "In Defense of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communication and Voting with Private Beliefs and Values," Papers 04-06-2004, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
  26. Johanna Goertz & Francois Maniquet, 2011. "On a Three-Alternative Condorcet Jury Theorem," CESifo Working Paper Series 3457, CESifo.
  27. Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar, 2001. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 259-294, November.
  28. Gerlach-Kristen, Petra, 2006. "Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 487-507, February.
  29. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01136390 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Hyoungsik Noh, 2023. "Conservativeness in jury decision-making," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 151-172, July.
  31. Sourav Bhattacharya, 2006. "Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections," Working Paper 325, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Dec 2008.
  32. Herrade Igersheim & Antoinette Baujard & Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," Working Papers halshs-01402275, HAL.
  33. Alexander Lundberg, 2020. "The importance of expertise in group decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 495-521, October.
  34. Mandler, Michael, 2012. "The fragility of information aggregation in large elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 257-268.
  35. Großer, Jens & Seebauer, Michael, 2016. "The curse of uninformed voting: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 205-226.
  36. Volker Hahn, 2012. "On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-24, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  37. Schaefer, Alexander, 2021. "Rationality, uncertainty, and unanimity: an epistemic critique of contractarianism," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 82-117, March.
  38. Johanna M.M. Goertz & Kirill Chernomaz, 2019. "Voting in Three-Alternative Committees: An Experiment," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-23, May.
  39. Mohamed Drissi-Bakhkhat & Michel Truchon, 2004. "Maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation with variable probabilities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(2), pages 161-185, October.
  40. Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir, 2009. "On Bayesian-Nash Equilibria Satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case," Discussion Paper Series dp527, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  41. Tajika, Tomoya, 2022. "Voting on tricky questions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 380-389.
  42. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Igal Milchtaich, 2007. "First and second best voting rules in committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(3), pages 453-486, October.
  43. Jianan Wang, 2021. "Evidence and fully revealing deliberation with non-consequentialist jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 515-531, December.
  44. Kohei Kawamura & Vasileios Vlaseros, 2013. "Expert Information and Majority Decisions," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 220, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  45. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Igal Milchtaich, 2003. "First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees," Working Papers 2003-08, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
  46. Sayantan Ghosal & Ben Lockwood, 2009. "Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: is turnout too high or too low?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 25-50, June.
  47. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2022. "Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 86-95.
  48. Masayuki Odora, 2024. "Fragility of The Condorcet Jury Theorem: Information Aggregation and Preference Aggregation," Working Papers 2308, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
  49. ,, 2016. "Condorcet meets Ellsberg," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
  50. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives," MPRA Paper 82753, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  51. Liu, Shuo, 2019. "Voting with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 694-719.
  52. Chernomaz, K. & Goertz, J.M.M., 2023. "(A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
  53. Patrick Hummel, 2012. "Deliberation in large juries with diverse preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 595-608, March.
  54. Kojima, Fuhito & Takagi, Yuki, 2010. "A theory of hung juries and informative voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 498-502, July.
  55. Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2002. "Delegation or Voting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-005/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  56. Ruth Ben-Yashar, 2006. "Information is important to Condorcet jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 305-319, June.
  57. Krishna K Ladha & Gary J. Miller, 2012. "The Paradox Of Unbiased Public Information," Working papers 102, Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode.
  58. Naruto Nagaoka, 2019. "Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem under Strategic Voting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(4), pages 2688-2696.
  59. Kohei, Kawamura & Vasileios, Vlaseros, 2013. "Expert Information and Majority Decisions," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-16, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  60. Hummel, Patrick, 2011. "Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-6, July.
  61. Volker Hahn, 2017. "On the drawbacks of large committees," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 563-582, May.
  62. Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir, 2012. "Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(1), pages 91-125, June.
  63. Adam Meirowitz, 2007. "In Defense of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communication and Voting with Private Beliefs and Values," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(3), pages 301-327, July.
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