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Politically Correct Information Adoption

Author

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  • Holm, Håkan

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

Abstract

This paper analyses the case when the political struggle not is channeled through policy choices, but through what information to adopt. The paper presents a simple model to analyze collective decisions of adopting new information when different parties' payoffs are contingent upon the new information. In equilibrium we demonstrate that the adopted information is biased towards “political correctness” rather than being informative (in the Blackwell sense). These results may be relevant when designing decision mechanisms for institutions that are to be keen on new information.

Suggested Citation

  • Holm, Håkan, 2000. "Politically Correct Information Adoption," Working Papers 2000:5, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2000_005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Informativeness; Majority Rule; Political Correctness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General

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