Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives
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Cited by:
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- Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & Ravindran, Dilip & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 665, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Amrita Dhillon & Grammateia Kotsialou & Dilip Ravindran & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2023. "Information aggregation with delegation of votes," Papers 2306.03960, arXiv.org.
- Tomoya Tajika, 2021. "Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 67-100, January.
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More about this item
Keywords
Elections; Information Aggregation; Access to Candidacy; Restrictions to Candidacy;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2018-02-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2018-02-05 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2018-02-05 (Positive Political Economics)
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