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Evidence and fully revealing deliberation with non-consequentialist jurors

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  • Jianan Wang

    (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

Abstract

We analyze a model of binary choice by a committee, when information is hard and pre-voting deliberation is allowed. Each member has, independently of the others, a positive probability of getting a private signal about the true state; with the remaining probability the member is uninformed. Hard information means that lying is disallowed during deliberation—informed members can reveal publicly or hide their signals, while uninformed voters have to disclose their ignorance. We allow non-consequentialist members whose thresholds for switching to the non-status-quo action vary with the number of informative signals. We show that in general, committee members will never reveal information fully during deliberation, even when we rule out partisan types who want the same action in all states. In particular, unanimity rule performs no worse than other rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Jianan Wang, 2021. "Evidence and fully revealing deliberation with non-consequentialist jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 515-531, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:189:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-021-00904-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-021-00904-y
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deliberation; Information revelation; Strategic voting; Collective choice; Non-consequentialist;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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