Rationality, uncertainty, and unanimity: an epistemic critique of contractarianism
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
- Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Sequential Equilibria,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
- David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 237, David K. Levine.
- David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
- Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
- Moehler, Michael, 2010. "The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice," Utilitas, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(4), pages 447-473, December.
- David M. Kreps, 2012. "Microeconomic Foundations I: Choice and Competitive Markets," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9890.
- Loungani, Prakash, 2001.
"How accurate are private sector forecasts? Cross-country evidence from consensus forecasts of output growth,"
International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 419-432.
- Mr. Prakash Loungani, 2000. "How Accurate Are Private Sector Forecasts: Cross-Country Evidence From Consensus Forecasts of Output Growth," IMF Working Papers 2000/077, International Monetary Fund.
- John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
- Feddersen, Timothy & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(1), pages 23-35, March.
- Wit, Jorgen, 1998. "Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 364-376, February.
- Buchanan, James M & Faith, Roger L, 1980. "Subjective Elements in Rawlsian Contractual Agreement on Distributional Rules," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(1), pages 23-38, January.
- Hausman,Daniel M., 1992. "The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521415019, December.
- Vanderschraaf, Peter, 2006. "War Or Peace?: A Dynamical Analysis Of Anarchy," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 243-279, July.
- Hausman,Daniel M., 1992. "The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521425230, December.
- Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, December.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Hun Chung & Brian Kogelmann, 2024. "Formal models in normative political theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(3), pages 256-274, July.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002.
"Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 31-48, March.
- Eraslan, H. & Merlo, A., 2000. "Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining," Working Papers 00-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Thijssen, J.J.J., 2003. "Investment under uncertainty, market evolution and coalition spillovers in a game theoretic perspective," Other publications TiSEM 672073a6-492e-4621-8d4a-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Patrick Hummel, 2012. "Deliberation in large juries with diverse preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 595-608, March.
- Alexander Lundberg, 2020. "The importance of expertise in group decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 495-521, October.
- Robert Sugden, 2002. "The evolutionary turn in game theory," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 113-130.
- Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992.
"Noncooperative models of bargaining,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225,
Elsevier.
- Binmore, K. & Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A., 1989. "Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining," Papers 89-26, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1990. "Noncooperative Models of Bargaining," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275482, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Hummel, Patrick, 2011. "Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-6, July.
- Ingela Alger & Jean-François Laslier, 2022.
"Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: Coordination and information aggregation,"
Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(2), pages 280-312, April.
- Alger, Ingela & Laslier, Jean-François, 2020. "Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation," IAST Working Papers 20-118, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), revised Oct 2021.
- Ingela Alger & Jean-François Laslier, 2022. "Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03682814, HAL.
- Ingela Alger & Jean-François Laslier, 2020. "Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation," Working Papers halshs-03031118, HAL.
- Ingela Alger & Jean-François Laslier, 2020. "Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation," PSE Working Papers halshs-03031118, HAL.
- Alger, Ingela & Laslier, Jean-François, 2020. "Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation," TSE Working Papers 20-1168, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Oct 2021.
- Ingela Alger & Jean-François Laslier, 2022. "Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation," Post-Print hal-03682814, HAL.
- Volker Hahn, 2012.
"On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts,"
Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz
2012-24, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
- Hahn, Volker, 2012. "On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62041, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Sexton, Richard J., 1991. "Game Theory: A Review With Applications To Vertical Control In Agricultural Markets," Working Papers 225865, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- S. Ali & Navin Kartik, 2012. "Herding with collective preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(3), pages 601-626, November.
- Kawamura, Kohei & Vlaseros, Vasileios, 2017. "Expert information and majority decisions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 77-88.
- Irene van Staveren, 2012. "An Evolutionary Efficiency Alternative to the Notion of Pareto Efficiency," Economic Thought, World Economics Association, vol. 1(1), pages 1-6, July.
- Xie, Yinxi & Xie, Yang, 2017. "Machiavellian experimentation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 685-711.
- Ruth Ben-Yashar & Igal Milchtaich, 2003. "First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees," Working Papers 2003-08, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Max Albert & Hartmut Kliemt, 2017. "Infinite Idealizations and Approximate Explanations in Economics," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201726, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Thomas R. Palfrey, 2005. "Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy," Working Papers 91, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Krishna K Ladha, 2012. "Perfection of the Jury Rule by Rule-Reforming Voters," Working papers 103, Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode.
- Morton, Rebecca B. & Piovesan, Marco & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2019.
"The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 461-481.
- Rebecca B. Morton & Marco Piovesan & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2012. "The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting," Harvard Business School Working Papers 13-017, Harvard Business School.
- Tyran, Jean-Robert & Morton, Rebecca & Piovesan, Marco, 2012. "The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 9098, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Morton, Rebecca B. & Piovesan, Marco & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2013. "The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-209, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Rebecca B. Morton & Marco Piovesan & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2012. "The Dark Side of the Vote - Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting," Discussion Papers 12-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Liu, Shuo, 2019.
"Voting with public information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 694-719.
- Shuo Liu, 2015. "Voting with public information," ECON - Working Papers 191, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jun 2017.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:37:y:2021:i:1:p:82-117_7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/eap .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.