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On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Emiliya Lazarova & Dinko Dimitrov, 2013. "Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1205-1229, April.
  2. Ed Hopkins, 2012. "Job Market Signaling Of Relative Position, Or Becker Married To Spence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 290-322, April.
  3. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2014. "Instrumental cardinal concerns for social status in two-sided matching with non-transferable utility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 174-189.
  4. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1085-1107, September.
  5. Lauermann, Stephan & Nöldeke, Georg, 2014. "Stable marriages and search frictions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 163-195.
  6. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2008. "Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 163-174, June.
  7. Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó, 2004. "Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets," Working Papers 147, Barcelona School of Economics.
  8. Du, Qingyuan & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2016. "A Darwinian perspective on “exchange rate undervaluation”," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 111-138.
  9. Ortega, Josué, 2018. "Social integration in two-sided matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 119-126.
  10. Mario Vozar, 2010. "The Effect of Time in a Multi-Dimensional Marriage Market Model," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp417, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  11. Simon Clark, 2002. "Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Two-sided Matching," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 84, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  12. Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2019. "School Choice and Loss Aversion," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 208, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  13. Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew, 2010. "Co-ranking mates: Assortative matching in marriage markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 177-179, March.
  14. Du, Qingyuan & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2013. "A theory of the competitive saving motive," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 275-289.
  15. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2007. "Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1073-1102, July.
  16. Wu, Qinggong, 2015. "A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 216-242.
  17. Vincent Iehlé & Julien Jacqmin, 2023. "SIGEM : analyse de la procédure d’affectation dans les grandes écoles de management," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 74(2), pages 139-168.
  18. Martin Browning & Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2024. "Spouses with Benefits: on Match Quality and Consumption inside Households," Working Papers ECARES 2024-11, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  19. Zixuan Peng & Wenxuan Shan & Peng Jia & Bin Yu & Yonglei Jiang & Baozhen Yao, 2020. "Stable ride-sharing matching for the commuters with payment design," Transportation, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 1-21, February.
  20. Alkan, Ahmet & Anbarci, Nejat & Sarpça, Sinan, 2012. "An exploration in school formation: Income vs. Ability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 500-504.
  21. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan S. Pereyra, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?," Papers 2212.02881, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
  22. Bloch, Francis & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2021. "Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 663-683.
  23. Akahoshi, Takashi, 2014. "Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-13.
  24. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2017. "Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1507-1534, June.
  25. Rajnish Kunar & Kriti Manocha & Josue Ortega, 2020. "On the integration of Shapley-Scarf housing markets," Papers 2004.09075, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
  26. Tobias Hiller, 2018. "On the Stability of Couples," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-10, July.
  27. Tom Truyts, 2010. "Social Status In Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 137-169, February.
  28. Morimitsu Kurino, 2020. "Credibility, efficiency, and stability: a theory of dynamic matching markets," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 135-165, January.
  29. Liu, Ce, 2023. "Stability in repeated matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
  30. Christopher Kah & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl, 2019. "Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core," Working Papers 1115, Barcelona School of Economics.
  31. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2022. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 18-33, March.
  32. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 237-239.
  33. Anderson, K.S., 2001. "Why Dowry Payments Declined With Modernisation in Europe but are Rising in India," Other publications TiSEM 8d8b080e-ea12-49b0-bf44-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  34. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off ?," Working Papers ECARES 2022-39, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  35. Karpov, Alexander, 2019. "A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 63-65.
  36. Muriel Niederle & Leeat Yariv, 2009. "Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences," NBER Working Papers 14840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  37. Salonen, Hannu & Salonen, Mikko A.A., 2018. "Mutually best matches," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 42-50.
  38. He, Fang & Yin, Yafeng & Chen, Zhibin & Zhou, Jing, 2015. "Pricing of parking games with atomic players," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 1-12.
  39. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2007. "Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 357-380, August.
  40. Vinay Ramani & K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao, 2018. "Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1137-1150, November.
  41. Philip J. Reny, 2021. "A simple sufficient condition for a unique and student-efficient stable matching in the college admissions problem," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(1), pages 7-9, April.
  42. Ce Liu, 2020. "Stability in Repeated Matching Markets," Papers 2007.03794, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
  43. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2006. "Which Inequality? The Inequality of Resources Versus the Inequality of Rewards," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000621, UCLA Department of Economics.
  44. Ehlers, Lars & Masso, Jordi, 2007. "Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 587-600, September.
  45. Klumpp, Tilman, 2009. "Two-sided matching with spatially differentiated agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(5-6), pages 376-390, May.
  46. Muriel Niederle & Leeat Yariv, 2009. "Decentralized Matching with Aligned Preferences," Working Papers 2009-3, Princeton University. Economics Department..
  47. Gregory Z. Gutin & Philip R. Neary & Anders Yeo, 2021. "Unique Stable Matchings," Papers 2106.12977, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
  48. Gutin, Gregory Z. & Neary, Philip R. & Yeo, Anders, 2023. "Unique stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 529-547.
  49. Kominers, Scott Duke, 2010. "Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 773-780, March.
  50. Zuckerman, David, 2024. "Multidimensional homophily," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 486-513.
  51. Federico Echenique & Joseph Root & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2024. "Stable matching as transportation," Papers 2402.13378, arXiv.org.
  52. Takumi Kongo, 2013. "An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 461-478, February.
  53. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2013. "Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 143-156.
  54. Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2007. "Beauty is a beast, frog is a prince :assortative matching in a nontransferable world," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7022, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  55. Jian Ni & Kannan Srinivasan, 2015. "Matching in the Sourcing Market: A Structural Analysis of the Upstream Channel," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(5), pages 722-738, September.
  56. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2006. "The Eeckhout Condition and the Subgame Perfect Implementation of Stable Matching," 2006 Meeting Papers 176, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  57. Anderson, K.S., 2001. "Why Dowry Payments Declined With Modernisation in Europe but are Rising in India," Discussion Paper 2001-7, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  58. Elin Colmsjoe, 2024. "A Flying Start: The Long-Run Effects of Inter Vivos Transfers," CEBI working paper series 24-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. The Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality (CEBI).
  59. Siwan Anderson, 2003. "Why Dowry Payments Declined with Modernization in Europe but Are Rising in India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(2), pages 269-310, April.
  60. Holzman, Ron & Samet, Dov, 2014. "Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 277-285.
  61. Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl & Christopher Kah, 2021. "Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(4), pages 797-816, November.
  62. Jaeok Park, 2017. "Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 487-509, May.
  63. Qingyuan Du & Shang-Jin Wei, 2010. "A Sexually Unbalanced Model of Current Account Imbalances," NBER Working Papers 16000, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  64. Galichon, Alfred & Ghelfi, Octavia & Henry, Marc, 2023. "Stable and extremely unequal," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
  65. Jiawei Chen, 2006. "Two-Sided Matching and Spread Determinants in the Loan Market," Working Papers 060702, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
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