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SIGEM : Analyse de la Procédure d’Affectation dans les Grandes Ecoles de Management
[SIGEM : analyse de la procédure d’affectation dans les grandes écoles de management]

Author

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  • Vincent Iehlé

    (UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université, LERN - Laboratoire d'Economie Rouen Normandie - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - IRIHS - Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Homme et Société - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université)

  • Julien Jacqmin

    (NEOMA - Neoma Business School)

Abstract

The SIGEM centralized procedure is in charge of assigning potential candidates to business schools in France. The analysis reveals the use of a well-know algorithm, namely the college-proposing version of the Gale and Shapley algorithm. The theoretical results of the two-sided matching literature, related to this algorithm, make possible the identification of fundamental properties satisfied by the procedure. Some specificities of the SIGEM environment may also generate behavioral biases on the side of participants, be they candidates or schools. We show how the outcome of the mechanism can be used to generate a strict ranking of schools. The implications of this common ranking of schools, specific to SIGEM, are also assessed.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent Iehlé & Julien Jacqmin, 2023. "SIGEM : Analyse de la Procédure d’Affectation dans les Grandes Ecoles de Management [SIGEM : analyse de la procédure d’affectation dans les grandes écoles de management]," Post-Print halshs-03135334, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03135334
    DOI: 10.3917/reco.742.0139
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03135334v3
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Julien Jacqmin & Mathieu Lefebvre, 2021. "The effect of international accreditations on students’ decisions: Evidence from French business schools," Working Papers of BETA 2021-06, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

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