Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003.
"Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matching,"
Working Papers
hal-00242988, HAL.
- Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2003. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings," Working Papers 05001, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
- Ehlers, Lars, 2004. "In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 249-270, August.
- Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2005.
"Stable matchings and preferences of couples,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 75-106, March.
- Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," Working Papers 117, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Roth, Alvin E., 1989. "Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 191-209, June.
- Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2003.
"Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(6), pages 1342-1352, December.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Niederle, Muriel, 2003. "Unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market: Gastroenterology with and without a centralized match," Scholarly Articles 29408444, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Muriel Niederle & Alvin E Roth, 2003. "Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000428, David K. Levine.
- Koji Takamiya, 2003. "On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(1), pages 77-83.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Masso, Jordi, 1997.
"Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 464-475, August.
- Dutta, B. & Masso, J., 1996. "Stability of Matchings when Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 325.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Eeckhout, Jan, 2000. "On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-8, October.
- Alvin E. Roth & Uriel G. Rothblum, 1999. "Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 21-44, January.
- Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 677-690, May.
- Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2002.
"The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1341-1378, July.
- Roth, Alvin E., 2002. "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Scholarly Articles 33445961, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dipjyoti Majumdar & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 523-540, March.
- Roth, Alvin E, 1984.
"The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
- Roth, Alvin E., 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Scholarly Articles 29410143, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 197-204, November.
- Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999.
"The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
- Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," NBER Working Papers 6963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alvin E. Roth, 1982. "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 617-628, November.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó, 2004.
"Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets,"
Working Papers
147, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó, 2004. "Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 637.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017.
"An invitation to market design,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
- Scott Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent Crawford, 2017. "An Invitation to Market Design," Working Papers 2017-069, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Kominers, Scott Duke & Teytelboym, Alexander & Crawford, Vincent P, 2017. "An invitation to market design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3xp2110t, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-627, June.
- Ehlers, Lars & Massó, Jordi, 2015.
"Matching markets under (in)complete information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 295-314.
- EHLERS, Lars & MASSÓ, Jordi, 2007. "Matching Markets under (In)complete Information," Cahiers de recherche 01-2007, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- EHLERS, Lars & MASSÓ, Jordi, 2007. "Matching Markets under (In)complete Information," Cahiers de recherche 2007-01, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Haeringer, Guillaume & Klijn, Flip, 2009.
"Constrained school choice,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1921-1947, September.
- Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2006. "Constrained School Choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 671.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 02 Dec 2008.
- Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2008. "Constrained School Choice," Working Papers 294, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Alvin Roth, 2008.
"Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
- Alvin E Roth, 2007. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000283, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Roth, Alvin, 2008. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Scholarly Articles 2579651, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," NBER Working Papers 13225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2009.
"What Have We Learned from Market Design?,"
Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 79-112.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2008. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(527), pages 285-310, March.
- AlvinE. Roth, 2008. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(527), pages 285-310, March.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2008. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 119-147, January.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 9, pages 79-112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "What Have We Learned From Market Design?," NBER Working Papers 13530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roth, Alvin, 2008. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Scholarly Articles 2579650, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2009.
"The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices,"
NBER Chapters, in: Studies of Labor Market Intermediation, pages 235-271,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices," NBER Working Papers 13529, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Assaf Romm, 2014. "Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 851-875, December.
- Coles, Peter & Shorrer, Ran, 2014.
"Optimal truncation in matching markets,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 591-615.
- Peter A. Coles & Ran I. Shorrer, "undated". "Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets," Working Paper 89386, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Peter Coles & Ran Shorrer, 2013. "Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets," Working Papers 2013.49, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006.
"Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
639, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," NBER Working Papers 11965, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001022, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Committee, Nobel Prize, 2012. "Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley: Stable allocations and the practice of market design," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2012-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013.
"School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 80-106, February.
- Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2011. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 784, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2011. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation," NBER Working Papers 16783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Péter Biró & Flip Klijn, 2013.
"Matching With Couples: A Multidisciplinary Survey,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-18.
- Peter Biro & Flip Klijn, 2011. "Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1139, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Pais, Joana, 2008.
"Incentives in decentralized random matching markets,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 632-649, November.
- Joana Pais, 2006. "Incentives in Decentralized Random Matching Markets," Working Papers Department of Economics 2006/12, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa.
- Jonathan M.V. Davis, 2017. "The Short and Long Run Impacts of Centralized Clearinghouses: Evidence from Matching Teach For America Teachers to Schools," 2017 Papers pda791, Job Market Papers.
- Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito, 2010. "Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1704-1723, September.
- Alvin E. Roth, 2010. "Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions," NBER Working Papers 16556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Takumi Kongo, 2013. "An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 461-478, February.
- Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2005.
"The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match?,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 372-375, May.
- Roth, Alvin & Niederle, Muriel, 2005. "The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be A Match?," Scholarly Articles 2562766, Harvard University Department of Economics.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:587-600. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.