Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey Of Empirical Evidence, Revised Version
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- Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hopp� & Bj�rn Schmalfuss, "undated". "Random Fixed Points in a Stochastic Solow Growth Model," IEW - Working Papers 065, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
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More about this item
Keywords
Crowding effect; intrinsic motivation; principal-agent theory; economic psychology; experiments;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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