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The economics of non-attendance and the expected effect of charging a fine on non-attendees

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  • Bech, Mickael

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  • Bech, Mickael, 2005. "The economics of non-attendance and the expected effect of charging a fine on non-attendees," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 181-191, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:74:y:2005:i:2:p:181-191
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000. "A Fine is a Price," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, January.
    2. Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Frey, Bruno S & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1997. "The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 746-755, September.
    5. Akerlof, George A & Dickens, William T, 1982. "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 307-319, June.
    6. Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes, 1974. "Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck74-1.
    7. Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2001. "Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
    8. Bruno S. Frey, 1997. "Not Just for the Money," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1183.
    9. repec:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:63-64:p:07 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Jegers, Marc & Kesteloot, Katrien & De Graeve, Diana & Gilles, Willem, 2002. "A typology for provider payment systems in health care," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 255-273, June.
    11. Isaac Ehrlich, 1996. "Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 43-67, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dantas, Leila F. & Fleck, Julia L. & Cyrino Oliveira, Fernando L. & Hamacher, Silvio, 2018. "No-shows in appointment scheduling – a systematic literature review," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 122(4), pages 412-421.
    2. Mark Dusheiko & Hugh Gravelle, 2015. "Choosing and booking – and attending? Impact of an electronic booking system on outpatient referrals and non-attendances," Working Papers 116cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    3. Adel Alaeddini & Kai Yang & Chandan Reddy & Susan Yu, 2011. "A probabilistic model for predicting the probability of no-show in hospital appointments," Health Care Management Science, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 146-157, June.
    4. Simsek, Serhat & Dag, Ali & Tiahrt, Thomas & Oztekin, Asil, 2021. "A Bayesian Belief Network-based probabilistic mechanism to determine patient no-show risk categories," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    5. Boone, Claire E & Celhay, Pablo & Gertler, Paul & Gracner, Tadeja & Rodriguez, Josefina, 2022. "How scheduling systems with automated appointment reminders improve health clinic efficiency," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).

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