Self-Confidence and Social Interactions
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Other versions of this item:
- R. Benabou & J. Tirole, 1999. "Self-Confidence and Social Interactions," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2000. "Self-Confidence and Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 7585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Self-Confidence And Social Interactions," Working Papers 151, Princeton University, School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
MOTIVATION ; PSYCHOLOGY ; BEHAVIOUR ; SOCIETY;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
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