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Legislative Autolimitation under Divided Government: Evidence from the German Case, 1976-2002

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  • Manow, Philip
  • Burkhart, Simone

Abstract

Most efforts to detect the consequences of divided government in German federalism by analyzing legislative statistics have been unsuccessful. Therefore, there is still much debate in Germany about the gridlock potential of divided government, as there is in the United States. Using a game-theoretic model, this paper investigates the impact of divided government on the strategic choices of government and opposition. The main conclusion of our model is that a strong opposition dominance in the Bundesrat usually does not lead to open party-political conflict, but rather to legislative autolimitation of the government which anticipates the opposition?s veto potential. However, if majorities in the Bundesrat are narrow, both government and opposition opt for less moderate policy positions, and as a result legislation is characterized by intense partypolitical conflict. The hypotheses following from the model are tested on a detailed data set comprising all legislative activity in Germany between 1976 and 2002. The results confirm the thesis that the main effect of divided government is that it induces 'legislative autolimitation' on the part of the government. We conclude that when majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat diverge, the impact on legislation is substantial.

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  • Manow, Philip & Burkhart, Simone, 2004. "Legislative Autolimitation under Divided Government: Evidence from the German Case, 1976-2002," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/11, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:0411
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    1. Coleman, John J., 1999. "Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 821-835, December.
    2. Heller, William B, 2001. "Political Denials: The Policy Effect of Intercameral Partisan Differences in Bicameral Parliamentary Systems," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 34-61, April.
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    5. Burkhart, Simone, 2004. "Parteipolitikverflechtung: Der Einfluss der Bundespolitik auf Landtagswahlentscheidungen von 1976 bis 2002," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    6. Tsebelis, George, 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(3), pages 289-325, July.
    7. Ganghof, Steffen, 2004. "Wer regiert in der Steuerpolitik? Einkommensteuerreform zwischen internationalem Wettbewerb und nationalen Verteilungskonflikten," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 50, number 50.
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    1. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:47:y:2009:i::p:175-197 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Scharpf, Fritz W., 2005. "No exit from the joint decision trap? Can German federalism reform itself?," MPIfG Working Paper 05/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

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