IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/publus/v45y2015i4p653-685..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Who Likes to Fend for Oneself? Revenue Autonomy Preferences of Subnational Politicians in Germany

Author

Listed:
  • Friedrich Heinemann
  • Eckhard Janeba
  • Marc-Daniel Moessinger
  • Christoph Schröder

Abstract

In the context of German federalism and its current reform debate, this article explores the federal reform preferences of members from all sixteen German Länder parliaments. We examine the role of Länder self-interest, party ideology, and individual characteristics to understand the preferences for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization. One clear result is the joint importance of ideology and jurisdictional interests. We use the empirical results to simulate which type of reform would garner the necessary support in Germany’s upper house, the Bundesrat. Finally, we draw conclusions for federal reform strategies which could enjoy the support of veto players who feel disadvantaged.

Suggested Citation

  • Friedrich Heinemann & Eckhard Janeba & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Christoph Schröder, 2015. "Who Likes to Fend for Oneself? Revenue Autonomy Preferences of Subnational Politicians in Germany," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 45(4), pages 653-685.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:45:y:2015:i:4:p:653-685.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pjv022
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Scharpf, Fritz W., 2005. "No exit from the joint decision trap? Can German federalism reform itself?," MPIfG Working Paper 05/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    2. Heinemann, Friedrich & Janeba, Eckhard & Schröder, Christoph & Streif, Frank, 2016. "Fiscal rules and compliance expectations – Evidence for the German debt brake," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 11-23.
    3. Heinemann Friedrich & Janeba Eckhard & Moessinger Marc-Daniel & Schröder Christoph & Streif Frank, 2014. "Föderalismus-Präferenzen in den deutschen Landesparlamenten," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 56-74, February.
    4. Jochimsen, Beate & Thomasius, Sebastian, 2014. "The perfect finance minister: Whom to appoint as finance minister to balance the budget," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 390-408.
    5. Fritz Scharpf, 2005. "No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself?," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 24, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    6. Jonathan A. Rodden & Gunnar S. Eskeland (ed.), 2003. "Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262182297, April.
    7. repec:ces:ifodic:v:11:y:2014:i:4:p:19105986 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Blesse Sebastian & Berger Melissa & Heinemann Friedrich & Janeba Eckhard, 2017. "Föderalismuspräferenzen in der deutschen Bevölkerung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 145-158, June.
    2. Heinemann, Friedrich & Janeba, Eckhard & Schröder, Christoph & Streif, Frank, 2016. "Fiscal rules and compliance expectations – Evidence for the German debt brake," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 11-23.
    3. Dirk Foremny & Ronny Freier & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Mustafa Yeter, 2018. "Overlapping political budget cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 1-27, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Blesse Sebastian & Berger Melissa & Heinemann Friedrich & Janeba Eckhard, 2017. "Föderalismuspräferenzen in der deutschen Bevölkerung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 145-158, June.
    2. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:44:y:2006:i::p:845-864 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Felix Rösel, 2017. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Supervision and Budget Deficits: Evidence from Germany," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 38, pages 641-666, December.
    4. Scharpf, Fritz W., 2006. "Nicht genutzte Chancen der Föderalismusreform," MPIfG Working Paper 06/2, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    5. Heinemann, Friedrich & Janeba, Eckhard & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Schröder, Christoph, 2013. "Revenue autonomy preference in German state parliaments," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-090, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Maaser, Nicola & Stratmann, Thomas, 2018. "Election rules, legislators' incentives, and policy outcomes: Evidence from the mixed member system in Germany," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 227-239.
    7. Markus Tepe & Pieter Vanhuysse, 2009. "Educational business cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 61-82, April.
    8. Dietrichson, Jens & Ellegård, Lina Maria, 2015. "Assist or desist? Conditional bailouts and fiscal discipline in local governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 153-168.
    9. Monstadt, Jochen & Scheiner, Stefan, 2014. "Allocating greenhouse gas emissions in the German federal system: Regional interests and federal climate governance," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 383-394.
    10. Zhiyong An & Yilin Hou, 2020. "Debt authority and intentional overstatement of budgetary deficit: evidence from Chinese Provinces," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(2), pages 461-477, April.
    11. Leanora Alecia Brown & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2015. "International Debt Forgiveness: Who Gets Picked and Its Effect On The Tax Effort Of Developing Countries," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1504, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    12. Johannes Blum & Klaus Gründler & Raphael de Britto Schiller & Niklas Potrafke, 2019. "Die Schuldenbremse in der Diskussion – Teilnehmer des Ökonomenpanels mehrheitlich für Beibehaltung," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 72(22), pages 27-33, November.
    13. Chunli Shen & Jing Jin & Heng-fu Zou, 2012. "Fiscal Decentralization in China: History, Impact, Challenges and Next Steps," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 13(1), pages 1-51, May.
    14. World Bank, 2003. "Decentralizing Indonesia : A Regional Public Expenditure Review Overview Report," World Bank Publications - Reports 14632, The World Bank Group.
    15. Gutmann, Jerg & Metelska-Szaniawska, Katarzyna & Voigt, Stefan, 2024. "Leader characteristics and constitutional compliance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    16. Dörrenberg Philipp & Heinemann Friedrich & Khayal Nuri, 2015. "Reformoptionen für den deutschen Finanzföderalismus," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 26-43, March.
    17. Gianmarco Daniele & Amedeo Piolatto & Willem Sas, 2018. "Who Sent You? Strategic Voting, Transfers and Bailouts in a Federation," Working Papers. Serie AD 2018-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    18. Dilla, Diana, 2017. "Staatsverschuldung und Verschuldungsmentalität [Public Debt and Debt Mentality]," MPRA Paper 79432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Asatryan, Zareh & Castellón, César & Stratmann, Thomas, 2018. "Balanced budget rules and fiscal outcomes: Evidence from historical constitutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 105-119.
    20. Sebastian Blesse & Pierre C Boyer & Friedrich Heinemann & Eckhard Janeba & Anasuya Raj, 2019. "European Monetary Union reform preferences of French and German parliamentarians," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(3), pages 406-424, September.
    21. Cont, Walter & Porto, Alberto, 2014. "Personal and regional redistribution through public finance in a federal setting," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 563-578.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:45:y:2015:i:4:p:653-685.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/publius .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.