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Das kalifornische Strommarktdebakel: von Liberalisierungsversprechen und Regulierungsversagen

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  • Kumkar, Lars

Abstract

Im Mittelpunkt dieses Beitrags steht eine Analyse des kalifornischen Strommarktdebakels und der Lehren aus den dortigen Ereignissen. Das Papier geht auf die Entwicklung der Märkte ein und zeigt die Gründe für das Scheitern des kalifornischen Übergangsmodells auf. Die Analyse zeigt, dass es sich in der kalifornischen Stromwirtschaft derzeit möglicherweise nur um die Ruhe vor dem nächsten Sturm handelt. Zentrale Fragen der Regulierungspolitik sind ungeklärt und die kalifornische Politik scheint derzeit nicht in der Lage, die Probleme zu lösen, die sie zum großen Teil selbst verursacht hat. Das Papier zeigt aber auch, dass den europäischen Märkten aus mehreren Gründen gegenwärtig kein ähnliches Schicksal droht wie dem kalifornischen.

Suggested Citation

  • Kumkar, Lars, 2002. "Das kalifornische Strommarktdebakel: von Liberalisierungsversprechen und Regulierungsversagen," Kiel Working Papers 1097, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1097
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kumkar, Lars, 2001. "Die Grundzüge der Strommarktregulierung auf der Bundesebene der Vereinigten Staaten und in Kalifornien," Kiel Working Papers 1022, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Santa, Donald F., 2001. "Welcome to the Hotel California, , , : How Will the California Electricity Crisis Shape Federal Energy Policy?," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 54-69, July.
    3. Kumkar, Lars, 2001. "Strommarktliberalisierung in Kalifornien: Schlägt das Pendel zurück?," Kiel Discussion Papers 378/379, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Hobbs, Benjamin F. & Iñón, Javier & Stoft, Steven E., 2001. "Installed Capacity Requirements and Price Caps: Oil on the Water, or Fuel on the Fire?," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 23-34, July.
    5. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell & Christopher R. Knittel & Catherine Wolfram, 2001. "Trading Inefficiencies in California's Electricity Markets," NBER Working Papers 8620, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Kumkar, Lars, 2001. "Strommarkt Kalifornien: Ein Liberalisierungsmodell kämpft um das politische Überleben," Kiel Working Papers 1023, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christian von Hirschhausen & Hannes Weigt, 2007. "Aktive Wettbewerbspolitik für effiziente Elektrizitätserzeugungsmärkte: Instrumente, internationale Erfahrungen und wirtschaftspolitische Schlussfolgerungen," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 76(1), pages 65-86.
    2. Weigt, Hannes, 2009. "A Review of Liberalization and Modeling of Electricity Markets," MPRA Paper 65651, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elektrizitätshandel; Elektrizitätswirtschaft; Liberalisierungspolitik; Investitionsregulierung; Regulierungsversagen;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities

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