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Strommarkt Kalifornien: Ein Liberalisierungsmodell kämpft um das politische Überleben

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  • Kumkar, Lars

Abstract

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Entwicklungen im restrukturierten kalifornischen Strommarkt. Dabei wird zu Beginn auf die Entwicklungen sowohl der Marktstrukturen als auch der Preise seit 1998 eingegangen. Anschließend wird nach den Ursachen für die enormen Preissteigerungen seit dem Frühsommer 2000 gefragt. Im letzten Kapitel werden die Ergebnisse zusammengefasst und einige Schlussfolgerungen präsentiert.

Suggested Citation

  • Kumkar, Lars, 2001. "Strommarkt Kalifornien: Ein Liberalisierungsmodell kämpft um das politische Überleben," Kiel Working Papers 1023, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1023
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kumkar, Lars, 2001. "Die Grundzüge der Strommarktregulierung auf der Bundesebene der Vereinigten Staaten und in Kalifornien," Kiel Working Papers 1022, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. David M. Newbery, 1998. "Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 726-749, Winter.
    3. Thomas P. Lyon, 1991. "Regulation with 20-20 Hindsight: "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose"?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 581-595, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kumkar, Lars, 2002. "Das kalifornische Strommarktdebakel: von Liberalisierungsversprechen und Regulierungsversagen," Kiel Working Papers 1097, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Marcelo Cabús Klötzle & Fábio Luiz Biagini, 2002. "A Restruturação do Sector Eléctrico Brasileiro: Uma análise comparativa com a Califórnia," FEP Working Papers 115, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    3. Kumkar, Lars, 2001. "Strommarktliberalisierung in Kalifornien: Schlägt das Pendel zurück?," Kiel Discussion Papers 378/379, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities

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